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REDRAFrJNG REVERSE REMOVAL: FouR
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE'S COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT

Abstract
Many commentators have recommended the enactment of federal
complex litigation legislationwhich would allow certain cases filed
in federal court to be "removed" to state court for consolidated
trial with other similar cases. The American Law Institute has
recently drafted a provision that would allow this "reverse removal" and is recommending that Congress turn it into legislation.
After discussing the procedural issues at stake in the American
Law Institute's proposal, the author recommends that the provision
state that the state court's jurisdiction over the transferred defendants be measured by weighing the defendant's hardship in pursuing the case against the interests of the other parties to proceed
collectively, while the court's jurisdiction over the transferred
plaintiffs be presumptively valid. Finally, the author recommends
that, prior to transfer, the federal court must obtain consent to the
transferfrom the state's highest court and that the parties should
participate in the consent process.
I.

INTRoDUCTION

This Note analyzes a recent recommendation to Congress from
the American Law Institute (ALl) that would allow certain complex
litigation cases' to be removed from the federal court system and
1. For purposes of this Note, the term "complex litigation" is contrasted with the
term "simple litigation" and is understood to mean multiparty, multiforum litigation charThis is the definition used
acterized by related claims dispersed throughout several foro.
by the ALI in its Complex Litigation Project. See CoiPLEX LrIGATION PROJECr 9 (Proposed Final Draft 1993). For a brief explanation of this definition, see infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
The terms "complex" and "simple" litigation do not have commonly recognized deft-
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consolidated with factually similar state court cases.2 Removal

nitions. Often "complex litigation" can mean litigation which presents difficult problems
for adjudication. However, after the 1950s antitrust prosecution of a large number of
electrical equipment manufacturers, see CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACnONS (1973), the term "complex litigation" has
taken on more specific overtones for proceduralists and trial lawyers. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION ii (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter MANUAL] (describing antitrust
cases as impetus for the original drafting of the Manual). Consequently, "complex litigation" has come to refer to claims arising out of specific societal and procedural contexts.
Judge Williams' statement, in In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), highlights this point by comparing "traditional" litigation with class actions as follows:
In a complex society such as ours, the phenomenon of numerous persons
suffering the same or similar injuries as a result of a single pattern of misconduct on the part of a defendant is becoming increasingly frequent.
The judicial system's response to such repetitive litigation has often been
blind adherence to the common law's traditional notion of civil litigation as
necessarily private dispute resolution (footnote omitted). In situations where this
traditional mode of litigation threatens to leave large numbers of people without
a speedy and practical means of redress and simultaneously threatens to expose
defendants to continuing punishment for the same wrongful acts, the class action device is a powerful tool to accomplish its proclaimed goals of judicial
economy and fairness.
Id.at 892 (footnote omitted).
Other authors have described complex litigation in a myriad of ways, ways which do
not even agree upon the important factors to be considered. E.g., MANUAL, supra, §§
0.20-0.22 (describing "potentially complex cases" by focusing on the type of claim or the
procedural characteristics of the case); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1282-84 (1976) (describing complex litigation by
contrasting private, bipolar, self-contained, and party-initiated cases with "sprawling and
amorphous" public cases "intermixed with negotiating and mediating processes at every
point."); Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LmG. 213, 215
(1991) (describing judicial development of "the complex litigation phenomenon"); Judith
Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 22-24 (1991)
(defining complex litigation in terms of types of procedural aggregation); Thomas D.
Rowe & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7, 9 (1986) (limiting complex litigation to scattered, related
litigation); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 270 (defining complex tort litigation as "characterized by
thousands ...
of actual or potential plaintiffs residing in many different jurisdictions"
where the defendant's liability is "of an unprecedented magnitude that frequently threatens
[it] with bankruptcy"). Cf. Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action,
1989 U. ILL. L REV. 43, 44 (rejecting a description of "collective litigation" as "any
lawsuit with more than one person on either side of the 'v" because, inter alia, that
definition makes collective litigation "'so commonplace as to warrant no discussion'). See
generally RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLx LmGATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-3 (1985) (providing overview of
history of complex litigation).
2. See COMPLEX LrIGATON PROJECr, supra note 1, § 4.01.
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from federal to state court, or "reverse removal,"3 is a recent innovation in the area of complex litigation and one that raises new
questions about the limits of federalism and the extent of the procedural due process rights of federal litigants. This Note analyzes
the ALI's treatment of these issues and makes specific revisions of
the ALI's reverse removal provision. The recommendations in this
Note are intended to refine the ALI's reverse removal provision in
a manner consistent with existing constitutional notions of due
process and federalism while simultaneously satisfying the ultimate
rationale behind the ALI's proposal.4

3. "Reverse removal" has become the generally accepted idiom for the transfer of
federal cases to state courts similar to federal removal found at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
There is currently no known procedure which raises concerns corresponding to those
raised by reverse removal and one must stretch far to find remotely similar mechanisms.
See Thursday Morning Sessions, 69 A.L.L PROc. 183 (1992) [hereinafter Sessions]. Arthur
R. Miller commenting that "[t]he current law on federal-to-state transfer is, to put it mildly, nonexistent ...
. The analogues, the analogies, you can find are distant."). See also
id. at 188 (Herbert M. Watchtell stating "this is a concept that is previously unknown in
American law, and I think it should stay that way."). The judicially created doctrine of
abstention, which permits a federal court to withdraw its jurisdictional power over a case,
has been used to explain the constitutionality of reverse removal. For a more detailed
discussion of abstention, see infra note 108.
4. This Note recognizes that the American Law Institute's COMPLEX LITGATION PROJEcr has been developed in the context of a growing area of attention for legal scholars
and the organized bar.
Among the academic literature on complex litigation and mass tort litigation, representative examples include PETEm H. SHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic
DisASTERS IN THE CouRTs (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective
Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845 (1987); Paul S.
Bird, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YALE
LJ. 1077 (1987); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, Mass Tort Civil Litigation:
The Impact of ProceduralChanges on Jury Decisions, 73 JImICATURE 22 (1989); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLuM. L.
REV 669 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 877
(1987); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Mass Torts and the Conflict of Laws: The Airline Disaster,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV 157; Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for
Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. Cmi. L. Rev. 440 (1986); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L REv. 659 (1989) [hereinafter Mature
Mass Tort]; Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass Tort Case: A Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D.
Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
7 (1986); Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429
(1986); Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L
REV. 779 (1985); Roger FL Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989
U. IL. L. REV. 69 [hereinafter Dissent].
Additionally, the American Bar Association, see ABA Commission on Mass Torts,
Report Number 126 to the ABA House of Delegates (1989), and the Congress, see Multi-
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An example highlighting the need for a reverse removal procedure occurred in 1982 when the sudden collapse of the suspended

walkways at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City resulted in
litigation dispersed between the state courts and the federal district
court The overwhelming majority of cases arising out of the ho-

tel accident were filed in Missouri state courts However, the
residency of the parties kept the state and federal cases from being
tried together. The complete diversity rule7 prevented the Missouri
citizens from suing the owner of the hotel, a Missouri corporation,

in federal court. Likewise, the federal removal statute barred most
of the defendants from removing the state actions to federal court

because of their citizenship in the forum state.' The tiny group of
federal plaintiffs sought to include the state plaintiffs in a class
action.9 The federal plaintiffs' strategies ultimately led to a stay of
the state court proceedings. Thus, the presence of a small number of federal plaintiffs separated from the bulk of the state litigation stalled the state court proceedings and created conflicts among

party, Multiforurn Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG.
REC. H3116-19 (daily ed. June 5, 1990), have contributed to the field by making recommendations for reform of current procedural mechanisms for adjudicating complex disputes.
See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
5. The state courts of Missouri heard the litigation of 120 cases resulting from the
Hyatt Regency disaster. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 n.5 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). On two occasions, twenty-four additional plaintiffs
unsuccessfully attempted to certify a mandatory class action in the federal district court of
Missouri. See id. at 1183 (denying first attempt at class certification); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 479, 482 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (denying second attempt at class certification). While the federal actions arrested the progress of the state proceedings and
caused friction between both litigants and judicial systems, the eventual settlement at the
state level provided the basic structure for a second settlement of the twenty-four related
claims filed in federal district court. See David R. Morris & Andrew See, The Hyatt
Skywalks Litigation: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 52 UMKC L REV. 246, 270 (1984).
Similarly, both the state and the federal courts have handled large-scale, related asbestos
claims in tandem. For example, at the time of its bankruptcy filing in 1984, nearly two
thirds of the 17,120 asbestos cases filed against Johns-Manville were filed in state courts.
See Martha M. Parrish, Asbestos Litigation-Dimensions of the Problem, STATE Cr. J.,
Winter 1984, at 4, 5 & n.2 (citing June 1, 1983 letter from senior attorney for Manville
Corporation to the National Center for State Courts indicating that the total pending cases
against Manville was 11,143 in state courts and 5,977 in federal courts).
6. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1177 n.5.
7. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (denying diversity jurisdiction if any plaintiff is a citizen of the state of any defendant).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988) (denying removal to federal court by a defendant
who "is a citizen of the State in which [the] action is brought").
9. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1178-79.
10. Id. at 1180.
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the plaintiffs."
On the other hand, bringing all the state actions to a single
federal court leaves much to be desired. Even if the federal rules
allowed the state cases to be brought to the federal court for trial
with the federal cases, the federal district court in Missouri would
have been required to manage over 200 related cases involving
questions of Missouri law.
Consequently, the availability of a device for reverse removal
of complex federal cases has become an attractive option for
proceduralists and trial lawyers. Commentators on complex litigation reform increasingly suggest that reverse removal would be a
useful weapon in the arsenal of procedures designed to further the
efficiency of handling dispersed actions. Such a device would have
the added benefit of reducing the workload within the nation's
judicial systems.
However, the possible benefits to be achieved by a reverse
removal procedure may be overshadowed by the serious problems
that reverse removal could create. Any recommendation that Congress enact a reverse removal statute must contend with justifying
the removal of cases from the federal courts to a state court system
without encroaching upon the constitutionally granted sovereignty
of the state whose court would receive the action? Moreover, what
safeguards exist to prevent the removal of the federal case from infringing upon the litigants' procedural due process rights to, among
other things, choose the forum for their litigation?
In the discussion surrounding reverse removal, these issues
have not gone unnoticed. However, a thorough explanation of how
a reverse removal statute could be drafted to accommodate them
has yet to be undertaken. Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recommended that Congress legislate a reverse removal provision requiring all related cases to be sent to a single, interested state court,
but he did not elaborate on this suggestion. Fifth Circuit judge

11. See Judith Whittaker, Skywalk Wars, 52 UMKC L. REV. 296, 296 (1984) ("The
real story of the Hyatt litigation was not a contest between plaintiffs and defen-

dants .... The dramatic contest of this litigation was a fight between two groups of
plaintiffs... :1.
12. Judge Weinstein writes:

In some instances it might be more sensible to send all the cases to the
court system of the state with the predominant interest. In part this can be
accomplished through federal stays, applications of forum non conveniens concepts and deferential refusals to accept jurisdiction. A more direct and compre-
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Alvin Rubin also alluded to reverse removal in his recommendation
that such a procedure would overcome the jurisdictional difficulties
encountered in multiparty litigation.'3 Rubin, acknowledging that
reverse removal would raise constitutional and practical questions,
concluded without analysis that "these questions seem to be answerable."' 4 Another commentator persuasively highlighted the
benefits to be gained by allowing the federal Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation" to transfer some of their cases to state
court. He also suggested the possible constitutional bases for limiting federal court jurisdiction in these cases, but failed to address
concerns dealing with fairness to the litigants and the federalism
limitations that would govern federal and state court interaction in
the reverse removal context.'6
The American Law Institute provided a detailed proposal for
reverse removal in Section 4.01 of its Complex Litigation Project.'" Section 4.01 would allow cases with one or more common
questions of fact or law to be transferred and consolidated in a
single state trial court if the number of cases pending in the federal
system is minimal compared to the number of cases pending in the
state systems and the state trial court would be the best court to

hensive approach probably could be provided by Congress ...
Under such a
scheme, federal and state cases would be transferred to a single state forum,
provided perhaps--as a matter of comity-that the state court involved consented.
Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11
COLum. J. Etqv. L. 1, 23-24 (1986). Weinstein offers no detail as to how this legislation
would operate other than merely asserting that Congress' Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause powers, in addition to its authority to regulate the business of the federal
courts, would permit reverse removal legislation in the complex litigation area. While this
may be correct, reverse removal legislation would be ineffective without guidelines as to
*the limits of the federal courts' ability to transfer complex cases to state court. For a
discussion of those congressional powers, see infra note 111.
13. Rubin, supra note 4, at 449 ("Conflicting state and federal jurisdiction might be
eliminated by providing for removal of mass tort cases pending in state courts or by
'reverse removal' of federal cases to a state court so that all cases could be tried in one

forum:1.
14. Id.
15. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consists of seven federal circuit and
district judges and was created by Congress to administer the transfer of actions to be
consolidated under the federal multidistrict litigation statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988). See
Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1001, 1002-09 (1974).

16. See George T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in
State Courts, 96 YALE Li. 1099, 1110, 1112 (1987).
17. CoMP.EX LITIGATION PRomncr, supra note I, § 4.01.
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maintain efficiency and fairness to the parties." Under Section
4.01, a centralized federal tribunal would use a multiple factor
analysis to determine which state court would be preferable as a
locus for the consolidation of the federal cases. 9 However, before

the transfer can occur, the state must consent to receiving the action.2a
The ALI is aware that Section 4.01 leaves certain federalism
and due process questions largely unanswered. To the extent that
these questions persist, certain formal aspects of the reverse removal procedure remain unclarified. In an attempt to refine those unclarified formal aspects of Section 4.01, this Note will explain and
answer those questions.
Part II of the Note describes the background against which
Section 4.01 must be analyzed. Specifically, part II begins by briefly describing the existing federal rules affecting complex litigation.
It then describes how other complex litigation proposals, designed
without a reverse removal provision, compare with the Complex
Litigation Project. This is followed by a more detailed explanation
of the purposes of the Complex Litigation Project and the first two
transfer procedures proposed by the ALL. Finally, part II concludes
with an examination and illustration of the reverse removal provision in Section 4.01.
Part III of the Note briefly discusses the four problems which
are left unanswered by Section 4.01. Each point in part Ill begins
with a recommended revision to the section, followed by a summary of the reasons for that recommendation. The four recommendations answer the following questions:
1) What constitutional standard will be used to determine
whether personal jurisdiction over the federal litigants can
be maintained by the state court to which the federal litigants will be removed?
2) What difference, if any, should be made when determining whether the state court which receives the action

18. Ia § 4.01(a).
19. See id.§ 4.01(b)(1)-(4).
20. rd § 4.01a).
21. See Sessions, supra note 3, at 183-84 (introductory remarks by COMPLX LrnGAMON PRowcr Reporter, Arthur t. Miller) C'[Section 4.01] raises federalism concerns and
it raises fairness concerns ....
We view this as sort of a toe in the water. We are not
asking people to jump head first without even knowing whether the pool is filled or
not.').
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has jurisdiction over the federal plaintiff?
3) Who in the state system should be given the authority
to consent to the transfer of the federal action to that state?
4) What legal restrictions can be put in place to ensure
that the state's consent is meaningful?
In part IV, each of the above problems is separately analyzed
and its corresponding recommendation is explained. Ultimately, the
Note recommends:
1)- The jurisdiction of the state transferee court should be
determined by weighing the individual litigants' hardship in
pursuing their cases in the chosen state court against the
combined interests of both the judiciary and all other involved litigants in adjudicating the matter collectively.
2) Personal jurisdiction of the state court over plaintiffs
should be presumed to exist unless plaintiffs can show
serious hardship in pursuing their cases in the state transferee court.
3) Before the federal action can be transferred to the state
court, the highest court of the state receiving the action
must consent to the transfer.
4) In order for consent to be meaningful, the parties must
obtain consent or must actively participate in the consent
process with the federal court transferring the action.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Existing Laws Governing ConsolidatedAdjudication

The current state of federal law impedes lawyers' attempts to
transfer and consolidate many related cases dispersed among different fora. Litigation may be combined for more efficient adjudication through the rules of joinder, intervention, class action, interpleader, and consolidation. However, these rules are limited in their
effectiveness. They are often unworkable or wholly inapplicable in
the context of the large-scale cases that pose the greatest predicament in complex litigation. Their jurisdictional requirements may
pose insurmountable obstacles, and they are often construed too
narrowly to assist in combining large numbers of cases dispersed
throughout various courts. A brief description of these rules and
their limitations is in order.
Compulsory joinder, under Rule 19, would join parties to an
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action whose presence is needed for a "just adjudication" if the
joinder is "feasible." An absent person will be considered necessary for a just adjudication if either that person or any party before
the court will be prejudiced by that person's absence, or if the
person's absence will prevent complete reliefLas These requirements prevent application of Rule 19 in the mass tort context because most courts hold that joint torffeasors or injured parties are
not necessary for a just adjudication.24
Permissive joinder, under Rule 20, allows claims or defenses
that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence to be combined
in order to reduce duplicative litigation. However, Rule 20 joinder requires that each joined party satisfy personal jurisdiction and
venue requirements. Thus, in a federal diversity action, the joinder of non-diverse parties is prohibited, thereby limiting the applicability of joinder in federal complex litigation. Also, because
permissive joinder must be invoked by the individual litigant,2
the combination of all parties in large-scale cases may be prevented
by litigants who, for tactical reasons, pursue their claims separately.
Intervention under Rule 24 may be helpful to bring small cases
together because it allows parties outside the main action to make
themselves a part of it. However, intervention is largely inappropriate for combining widely dispersed actions. Rule 24(a) grants intervention as a right where the outsider has an interest in the property
or transaction that is the subject of the main action and the
outsider's interests would be impaired by the action.a However,
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
23. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
24. See, e.g., Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir.
1983) ("It is beyond peradventure that joint tortfeasors are not indispensable parties in the
federal forum.'.
25. See FED. R. CiM. P. 20(a). The object of Rule 20 "is to promote trial convenience
and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits." 7
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1652 (2d ed. 1982)
(citations omitted). The rule thus authorizes joinder in more cases than was possible prior
to the enactment of the Federal Rules. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL, CIVIL PRoCEDURE § 6.4 (1985).
26. See, eg., Sherrell v. Mitchell Aero, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 219, 221 (E.D. Wis. 1971)

(explaining that pendant jurisdiction applies to diversity actions only where a federal question also exists).
27. See F.
R. CIv. P. 20(a) ("[Plersons may join in one action ... ifthey assert
any right to relief jointly, severally, or... arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences . . . ") (emphasis added).

28. See FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a). Applicants for intervention must be able to show that
the main action carries a possible detriment to them, thereby entitling them with a right
to influence the litigation. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (applicant
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Rule 24(a) is often read too narrowly to apply to large-scale actions, requiring more substantial involvement with the main action
by the intervenor.29
Rule 24(b) combines related litigation by allowing an outsider
who asserts a claim or defense with a question of fact or law
common to the main action to proceed in conjunction with the
main action at the trial judge's discretion where doing so increases
judicial economy." While more successful in combining certain

larger cases,3 Rule 24(b) may hinder aggregation because of its
requirement that all parties independently satisfy jurisdictional re-

quirements?2 Thus, parties who reside in different states may be

precluded from intervening even though they were all injured in

the same event or by the same transaction.
The federal class action rule,33 widely debated in the complex
litigation arena,34 is often unavailable in mass tort cases as well as
need only have a "significantly protectable interest" (quoting Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971))). They must also demonstrate that none of the existing parties
to the action will adequately represent their interests. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970, 973 (3d Cir. 1982) (suggesting that
existing party must be in collusion with opposing party, be hostile to intervenor, or fail
to be diligent in order to be an inadequate representative). Finally, intervention must be
timely. Cf. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 615 (1983) (explaining that even if an
application to intervene is timely, "permission to intervene does not carry with it the right
to relitigate matters already determined in the case").
29. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Belcher Oil Co., 82 F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (holding that consumers of electric utility service could not intervene as a matter of
right in lawsuit against oil company because their interests were adequately represented by
the utility).
30. See FED R. Ctv. P. 24(b) ("In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties.").
31. See Kendrick v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Ind. 1980) (allowing six plaintiffs to intervene in consumer credit action originally consisting of 42
plaintiffs); Moscarelli v. Stam, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that intervention is preferable to class action in securities fraud action brought by 25 plaintiffs); New
York City Transit Auth. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 40 F.R.D. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (allowing a
city and an interstate railway to intervene in antitrust suit against four major steel companies).
Such success may have as much to do with the language of the rule as it does with
the particular judge whose discretion is being exercised. See Stringfellow v. Concerned
Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987) ("Particularly in a complex case . . . . a
district judge's decision on how best to balance the rights of the parties against the need
to keep the litigation from becoming unmanageable is entitled to great deference.").
32. See Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[A] party
must have 'independent jurisdictional grounds' to intervene permissively under Rule
24(b).), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
33. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
34. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEvAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
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product liability, consumer, securities, and antitrust actions. Generally, Rule 23 allows the adjudication of claims or defenses in a
single lawsuit by a class of similarly situated parties s However,
the prerequisites to class certification 6 have been restrictively construed by the federal courts 7 Thus strictly construed, the requirement that a class share common questions of law or fact has prevented many multiparty tort actions from being certified as a class
because individual issues of damages, liability, and defenses would
affect the class members differently? 8 Additionally, the form of
class action best suited for large, multiparty actions, class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), contains a provision allowing each
class member to "opt out ' 340 of the class and proceed individually,
MODERN CLASS ACTION 238-66 (1987) (overview of the issues in modem class actions);
ARTHUR MnIE, AN OvERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND Fu-

TuRE 45 (1977) (explaining how Rule 23(b)(1) operates and its consequent problems);
Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REV.
1143 (1983).
35. See FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a) ('One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all... :).
36. In general a class must meet the requirements of commonality of facts, typicality
among claims, adequacy of representativeness of the entire class, and numerosity. FED. R.

CIv. P. 23.
37. See, e.g., Rex v. Owens, 585 F.2d 432, 435-36 (10th Cir. 1978) (mandating strict
burden of proof for potential class action plaintiffs).
38. See In re Northern Dist. of Ca. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the requirements of commonality, typicality, and
representativeness were not met in punitive damage class action brought by women claiming liability on various theories), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); La Mar v. H & B
Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973) (denying class certification for
independent tort claims unless separate actions will "inescapably... alter the substance
of the rights of others having similar claims"). But see Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc.,
782 F.2d 468, (5th Cir. 1986) (certifying class of 753 plaintiffs in asbestos case); In re
School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1984), amended in, 107 F.R.D.
215 (E.D. Pa. 1985), vacated in part, affd in part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 852 (1986) (granting conditional certification of class consisting of "essentially
all public school districts and private schools in the nation").
39. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions of law or fact predominate over all
the claims presented by the individual class members and that a class action is the superior method for achieving a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) is considered best suited for large, complex actions because it does not require evidence of a limited fund, as does Rule 23(b)(1)(B), see
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 277 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (denying certification of a Rule 23(b)(I)(B) class due to a lack of limited fund evidence), affid, 782 F.2d
468 (5th Cr. 1986), and because it is not limited to declaratory or injunctive relief, as is
Rule 23(b)(2), see FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2) (allowing class action where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole").

40. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) ("In any class action maintained under [23](b)(3), the
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thereby frustrating any attempts to ensure that all claims are litigated together.
Interpleader, under either Rule 22' or the Federal Interpleader
4
Act, ' allows a party to combine cases in which the party's prop-

erty is subject to two or more inconsistent claims. However, it is
not generally helpful in the complex litigation context because the
plain language of the rule requires a single party to join all others
with conflicting claims to the same property and to concede to the

others' right to such property. For instance, multiple tort claims,
readily in need of aggregation, may be brought against defendants

who do not concede the claimants' right to the property or who
have sufficient money to settle the liability to all the claimants.
Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 allows the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases pending in various federal
district courts to a single federal court for pre-trial proceedings if

those cases involve one or more common questions of fact." Unfortunately, the statute is limited to transfer and consolidation only
during pretrial proceedings,45 does not allow for consolidation of
federal and state cases, and does not offer adequate provisions for
the efficient handling of cases arising after the initial transfer.'

court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice... [advising] each member that ...
the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests.'). For a description of the procedure and effect of opting out, see 3 HEIERT B.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcrioNs § 16.14 (2d ed. 1985).
41. See FED. R. Cv. P. 22(1). Interpleader is a "procedural device which enables a
person holding money or property, in the typical case conceded to belong in whole or in
part to another, to join in a single suit two or more persons asserting mutually exclusive
claims to the fund." 3A JAMES MooRE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.02[1]
(2d ed. 1993).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1988). Section 1335 requires only minimal diversity
(see CHARM A. WRitGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 74 (4th ed. 1983)) which requires only
that two of the rival claimants be of diverse citizenship. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
43. See Paula J. McDermott, Comment, Can Statutory Interpleader Be Used as a Remedy by the Tortfeasor in Mass Tort Litigation?, 90 DIcK. L. REv. 439 (1985) (noting that
courts have refused to allow mass tort defendants to use statutory interpleader).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
45. See id. ("When civil actions . . . are pending in different districts, such actions
may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.")
(emphasis added).
46. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation defines tag-along actions as "civil action[s]
. . . involving common questions of fact with actions previously transferred under
Section 1407." The Judicial Panel presumes that new cases arising after the transfer of an
action should be transferred for consolidation with the earlier transferred cases. It has been
noted that:
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Comparison to Other Complex Litigation Reform Proposals

Comparing the Complex Litigation Project in light of Section
4.01 to other complex litigation proposals that do not contain a
reverse removal provision highlights the issues of fairness and
federalism that are raised by that section. One such proposal, H.R.
3406, although adhering to a stringent notion of fairness to litigants, lacks the flexibility of Section 4.01 of the Complex Litigation Project Section 4.01 and is consequently not as sensitive to
the docket pressures of state and federal courts. The American Bar
Association's proposal, while responsive to the risk of federal
intrusion on state judicial processes, puts more pressure on federal
courts than the ALI Complex Litigation Project's Section 4.01.
H.R. 3406, the proposal that has come the closest to being
enacted into legislation,4 9 would funnel certain complex cases into

It is more difficult to prevent transfer of a tag-along action than to prevent
initial transfer. The Panel tends to resolve all doubts in favor of transfer and is
inclined to defer to the transferee judge to sort out any unique problems associated with the tag-along action.
Wilson W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotham, Complex Multdistrict Litigation-An
Overview of 28 U.S.CA. § 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 33 (1979).
However, this presumption in favor of transfer is insensitive to the issues raised by
such later, "tag-along" actions. For instance, while it may be desirable to encourage litigants with timely claims to bring their complaints before a court, forcing the litigants to
raise their claims may be questionable. As one commentator notes:
Ignoring such claims could undermine the effort to deal as fully as possible
with large multiparty, multiclaim cases. Yet smoking out matured claims unfiled
but not time-barred is a sensitive matter on all sides, perhaps stirring up unnecessary litigation and liability but also raising significant problems of fairness to
the potential claimants if they could lose their claims and have not yet undertaken to defend their interests.
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Jurisdictionaland Transfer Proposalsfor Complex Litigation, 10
REV. LrnjG. 325, 344 (1991).
By comparison, the ALI COMPLEX ITIGATION PROJECr proposed another rule for
tag-along actions. The AL would require notice to all potential parties of the transferred
action and a court-ordered opportunity for intervention. See Complex Litigation Project,
supra note 1, § 5.05. All parties who would receive notice and do not file their actions
would later be subject to issue (but not claim) preclusion. See id. Though more sensitive
to the issues raised by tag-along actions, section 5.05 is not without controversy. Compare
Rowe, supra, at 345 (commending section 5.05 as offering a solution to existing preclusion problems) with Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the AL! Proposal 10 J.L. & CoM. 1, 59-60 (1990) (recommending that
parties should be able to elect whether to be benefitted or burdened by preclusion).
47. Multiforum, Multiparty Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(a) (1990).
48. ABA Comm. on Mass Torts, Report to the House of Delegates (Nov. 1989).
49. On June 5, 1990, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3406 with no objec-
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the federal court system where twenty-five or more persons have
died or been injured in an accident resulting in damages for
$50,000 or more per plaintiff and where any plaintiff is the citizen

of a state different from any defendant50 This method of consolidating complex cases would not be of help to long-term exposure
cases such as product and drug liability cases or asbestos cases

because the proposal limits the applicability of consolidation to
single-event accidents. Also, the proposal effectively erodes -state

court participation in a limited class of complex cases by giving
district courts original jurisdiction over these cases. This can have
dangerous consequences when the federal district court is forced to

choose which state law applies to the case at bar. To account for
this danger, H.R. 3406 authorized federal courts to create common
law for choice of law, an arguably dangerous authorization,5 by
supplying the courts with ten factors to consider in choosing the law.r

tion. 136 CONG. REC. H3116-19 (daily ed. June 5, 1990). However, the bill's enactment
was held up by the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee. See Charles G. Geyh,
Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REv. LMiG. 401, 415-18 (explaining that time constraints and the complexity of the House Bill may have been responsible for the Senate's reluctance to approve H.R. 3406 without more thorough review).
50. The language of the bill states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action involving
minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident,
where at least 25 natural persons have either died or incurred injury in the
accident at a discrete location and, in the case of injury, the injury has resulted
in damages which exceed $50,000 per person, exclusive of interest and
costs ....

H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1990).
51. In the landmark case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme
Court held that the existence of a federal common law is unconstitutional as an invasion
of the independence of the states.
52. These ten factors are:
1) The law that might have governed the jurisdiction created by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 did not exist;
2) The fora in which the clai-ns were or could have been brought;
3) The location of the accident and related transactions;
4) The parties' residence or place of business;
5)
The desirability of using uniform law for some or all of the litigation;
6)
Whether a change in law because of removal or transfer will result in
unfairness;
7) Avoiding forum shopping;
8) The jurisdiction's interest in applying its own law;
9)
The parties' reasonable expectations as to which law will apply,
10) Any agreement by the parties as to which law to apply.
H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., § 6(a) (1990).
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The advocates of H.R. 3406 point to the relative advantages of
creating minimal diversity jurisdiction for single-accident, multiparty, multiforum cases over the adoption of reverse removal jurisdiction. One of the House bill's strongest points is its recognition
of party initiative at some point in the consolidation process. Because H.R. 3406 grants original jurisdiction to the district courts,
those plaintiffs that satisfy the conditions of the legislation would
have to trigger the jurisdiction in their complaints by alleging the
statutory requirements. Additionally, advocates of H.R. 3406 may
be able to argue that the House bill would not risk unfairly restricting federal district court jurisdiction to the disadvantage of
federal plaintiffs who have chosen to bring their actions in federal
court. The proposed legislation evades the problems likely to be
encountered by Section 4.01 because it relies on minimal diversity
to bring would-be state cases into the federal courts for consolidation and adjudication.54 Consequently, the federal court's authority to adjudicate the dispute is not in question, unlike the state
court's authority to receive, as the transferee court, cases from the
federal system.
Where HR. 3406 succeeds in consolidating cases by slightly
expanding federal court jurisdiction through enactment of a minimal diversity statute, it fails in comparison to relative scope and
flexibility of Section 4.01 and raises serious constitutional questions
in its authorization of the creation of federal common law. The
ALI's reverse removal provision does not limit the benefits of
complex litigation reform to a limited class of plaintiffs because it
is not restricted to certain tort cases. Likewise, it is responsive to
burgeoning federal and state court dockets by allowing federal
cases to be transferred to state courts and by reserving state control
over the transfer through Section 4.01(a)'s consent requirement.
The American Bar Association's Commission on Mass Torts
53. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 46, at 346-47 (recommending that H.R. 3406 be idopted "as a limited, experimental first step toward expanding the federal judiciary's role in
dealing with mass-tort cases" before the "more comprehensive, visionary, and ambitious
structure of the ALI proposal"); Rowe & Sibley, supra note 4, at 11 ("While it would be
unorthodox to frame federal court subject matter jurisdiction in terms of any defendant's
residence in a state other than the locus of some events giving rise to the claim ....
this criterion nonetheless would provide a practical, workable basis for the jurisdiction.").
54. Statutory interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988), provides precedent for minimal diversity. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), the

Supreme Court held that this minimal diversity requirement is constitutional under Article
III. See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978) ('It
issettled that complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement.").
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has proposed a third vehicle for consolidation of multiparty,
multiforum cases. This proposal would allow the consolidation of
cases pending in federal district courts and state trial courts through
the creation of a judicial panel that would be responsible for the
management and transfer of cases5 The Commission's recommendation would limit the application of its consolidation measure to
civil tort claims resulting in 100 or more claimants and arising
from a single accident or exposure to a product or substance that
causes more than $50,000 in personal injury, property, or wrongful
death damages5 State cases would be moved to federal court
under innovative legislation that would federalize the choice of law
question in such cases, thereby granting original jurisdiction to the
federal district courts for these cases as actions "arising under" the
Constitution and laws of the United States.Y
The Commission recommended the limits on the class of cases
subject to its proposal, resisting broader application of consolidation, because of concern over federal court intrusion with state
jurisdiction 8 A belief that wide ranging consolidation would interfere with the attorney-client relationship also supports higher
standards for treatment under the Commission's recommendation 9
Finally, the Commission felt that there was insufficient need to
consolidate cases with less than 100 plaintiffs.'
The effectiveness of the ABA proposal would be significantly
less than the ALI's Complex Litigation Project largely because of
the narrow class of cases to which the Commission's recommendations would apply. Also, although the ABA went further than H.R.
3406 by including mass exposure cases, its proposal does not reach
as broad as the ALI's proposal, which applies to single accident
torts, mass exposure torts, and non-tort claims as well by virtue of
its transaction-based consolidation mechanism. The ALI's proposals
would apply to such things as securities actions, while the ABA's
could not because of its "single accident" requirement. The high
number of claimants required for consolidated treatment under the
ABA Report would also severely limit the number of cases that

55. ABA Comm. on Mass Torts, Report to the House of Delegates, Recommendation

2(a)(1) (November 1989).
56. Id.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at Recommendation 3.
See id. at 24.
See id. at 20.
See id.
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would benefit from aggregation.

C. The Aims of the Complex Litigation Project
In 1985, the American Law Institute began a project which
studied the current problems of complex litigation' The Complex
Litigation Project examined elements of the contemporary occurrences of multiparty, multiforum lawsuits. 62 Recognizing the ambiguity of the term "complex litigation, ' 63 the Project limited its
focus to the conflicts generated by multiparty, multiforum litigation.' According to the ALI, "Multiparty, multiforum litigation ... is characterized by related claims dispersed in several
forums and often over long periods of time ." Such litigation

too frequently results in taxing the resources of attorneys and their
clients, 66 adding duplicative cases to already overburdened court
dockets..7 delaying the resolution of disputes,s and reducing the
61. Instructive detailed discussion of the COMPLEX IMIGATION PaoJEcr can be found

in Epstein, supra note 46; Linda S.Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III
Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 169, 181-91 (1990); Resnik, supra note 1, at 40-43;
Rowe, supra note 46, at 330-37, 341-47.
62. See CoME!Ex LmGATION PROECT, supra note 1, at ch. 1, cmt. a.
63. See supra note 1.
64. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECr, supra note 1, at ch. 2, cmt. a.

65. Id.
66. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1463-64 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (discussing effects of fee arrangements on adequacy of representation and the possibility of inappropriate settlements in class actions), rev'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 216
(2d Cir. 1987); McGovern, Mature Mass Tort, supra note 4, at 659, 675-79 (describing
A.H. Robins Company's bankruptcy filing and subsequent disputes between judges, lawyers, and defendants as a result of approximately 16,000 personal injury claims filed
against Robins); Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REv.
LmO. 495, 511 (1991) (stating that "flawed fee arrangements.. . can cause
underrepresentation in consolidated suits"); see also Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks:
Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 386 (1987) (identifying the problem of conflicts of interest inherent in class litigation).
67. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988 (1982) (recognizing the duplication of litigation of common issues in state
and federal court); Note, Air Crash Litigation and 28 U.S.C. Section 1407: Experience
Suggests a Solution, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 927, 927-28 ('The multiple parties ...
which usually accompany air disasters produce massive litigation efforts in numerous
federal and state courts. Individual plaintiffs ... may file separate actions arising from
the same crash in several federal districts simply to obtain personal jurisdiction over each
defendant. Defendants complicate the process by cross-claiming among each other." (footnotes omitted)).
68. See Lindsey Grason, Ex-Love Canal Families Get Payments, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20,
1985, at B1 (reporting that plaintiffs in Love Canal environmental litigation received settlement seven years after filing); Andrew Wolfson, After 8 Years, A Complex Case Comes
to an End, NAT'L L., Aug. 19, 1985, at 6 (noting the settlement of cases eight years
after the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire).
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public's opinion of the legal system as a whole

9

The Complex

Litigation Project's purpose was to provide an "analysis of poten-

tially fruitful options for mitigating the problems these cases
pose"

and has resulted in what may now be the most thorough

and radical revision of the existing rules governing multiparty,
multiforum actions.!7 '
D.

Transfer Mechanisms and Transfer Authority Proposed
by the Complex Litigation Project

The ALI proposes a series of interrelated provisions designed
to consolidate actions scattered throughout various judicial systems

for trial in a single state trial cour

2

The general authority to

transfer is contained in Section 3.0L. Under Section 3.01, cases
subject to the Complex Litigation Project's broad transfer provisions include separate actions involving "one or more common
questions of fact"74 where "transfer and consolidation will promote

the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions."75 Cases to be
transferred should satisfy a series of criteria designed to ensure that
significant efficiency gains will be achieved by both the parties and

69. See Warren E. Burger, Foreword, American Law Institute Study on Paths to a
"Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE LJ. 808, 808 (asserting that the "public has a right to look to [lawyers] for... answers" concerning the
"critical condition" of the "machinery of justice"); Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness:
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE LJ. 1643, 1644 (1985) ('Whether we
have too many cases or too few, or even, miraculously, precisely the right number, there
can be little doubt that the system is not working very well:); see also Weinstein, supra
note 12, at 3 n.5 (stating that federal district and appellate courts expended an estimated
$10.1 million on asbestos-related claims in 1984); f Rubin, supra note 4, at 434 (defending complex litigation attorneys against charges of degeneracy for "making diligent efforts to protect those whom they are hired to represent").
70. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, at ch. 1, cmt. b.
71. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORT PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LMGATION 238-41 (1987) (identifying six broad areas of focus within the Complex Litigation
Project which "will require extremely bold steps" to obtain the "achievement of greater
efficiency," cited in Resnik, supra note 1, at 40); Rowe, supra note 46, at 341 (describing the ALI Project as "the most ambitious complex litigation effort now under way'); Cf
Epstein, supra note 46, at 2-3 (criticizing the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT as an "elaborate network of interlocking provisions" that result in "coerced consolidation" and dangerous reliance on the discretion of federal judges).
72. Cf. COMPLEX LIIATION PROJECT, supra note 1, at ch. 2, cmt. d ("Even a cursory
examination of the problems caused by complex litigation leads to the conclusion that
both state and federal courts should develop new procedures to consolidate the units of a
complex dispute.").
73. See id. § 3.01.
74. Id. § 3.01(a)(1).
75. Id. § 3.01(a)(2).
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the court system and that all litigants involved will be treated
fairly.76 Factors to be considered include: the number of parties
and actions, the geographic dispersion of the actions, any significance of local concern in the litigation, the subject matter of the
litigation, the amount in controversy, the number of common issues
shared by the actions, the likelihood that future related claims will
arise, the wishes of the parties, and the progress of already existing
claims. 7 The ALI proposed this balancing approach to allow finetuning and to permit transfer of cases which are not neatly categorized, but which may benefit from consolidation even though
they may not satisfy narrowly specified criteria.7
Besides Section 4.01's transfer of federal actions to state trial
courts,.7 two other types of transfer are authorized. The Complex
Litigation Project would allow the transfer of actions from one
federal district court to another" and removal of state actions to a
federal district court 8 ' Section 3.01 authorizes the transfer of actions from one federal district court to another This federal
intrasystem transfer follows the approach mapped out by the rules
governing multidistrict litigation under Section 1407.83 Section
3.01 differs from the multidistrict litigation statute in that the transferee court receiving the transferred action under the Complex
Litigation Project is granted more authority to completely adjudicate the disputes than are transferee courts under Section 1407.84
The transfer of actions from state courts to a federal district
court applies to state cases which meet the criteria of Section
3.01(a) and (b) and which arise from "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" as the pending
federal court action with which they will be consolidated. 8s Additionally, state-to-federal removal may not "unduly disrupt or impinge upon state court or regulatory proceedings or impose an
undue burden on the federal courts."8 Unlike the currently avail76. See id. § 3.01 cm. c.

77. Id. § 3.01(b)(2) a-h.
78. See id. § 3.01 cmt. b.

79. For a description of section 4.01, see infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
80. See CoMPL= LrIGATION PROJEcr, supra note 1, § 3.01(a).
81. See id. § 5.01.

82. Id. § 3.01(a).
83. Id. at ch. 3, crn. b.
84. IM; compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (allowing the transfer at cases for pretrial
proceedings only) with CoMPI,

LrIGATION PROECr, supra note 1, § 3.06 (empowering

the transferee court with full power to manage and try the consolidated proceedings).
85. CoMPLEX LrIGATION PRoJEcr, supra note 1, § 5.01(a).

86. Id. State-to-federal intersystem removal also turns on the application of a discre-
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able removal procedure, Section 5.01 does not restrict removal to

federal district courts which have independent jurisdiction over the
cases "7 and allows state cases to be considered for removal upon
the motion of any party to the state action or the certification of a
judge presiding over the action.88
A federal Complex Litigation Panel would decide how these
cases are transferred. 9 Ideally, the Panel would be composed of
nine federal judges serving for a fixed term of years. ° The

Panel's purpose is to provide one central body whose specialized
experience would expedite the decisionmaking process and allow

careful monitoring of the national complex litigation landscape.9 '
Like the currently existing Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
the Complex Litigation Panel would provide a single, experienced

decision-making body to implement the transfer of cases for consolidation without being swayed by the pressures of its own

docket. 9 In fact, the Panel would "absorb the existing panel, its
functions, and much of its jurisprudence."9' At its most basic levtionary balancing test including the following factors: the amount in controversy of the

state case; the number and size of actions involved; the number of jurisdictions in which
state cases are located; the avoidance of inconsistency of result the presence of local
concern; the possibility of developing cooperation or coordination with the state transferor
courts; and the change in the applicable law. Id.
87. See id.§ 5.01 cmt. a. ("Removal [under section 5.01] avoids duplicative or overlapping litigation that otherwise might occur when some of the claims or parties meet the
general standards for asserting federal jurisdiction and others do not:). Cf 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1988) ("[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant... .").
88. See COMPLEX LInGATION PRojEcr, supra note 1, § 5.01(e). Cf 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1988).
89. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROEmC, supra note 1, § 3.02.
90. See id.§ 3.02 cmt. d. At the time § 3.02 was drafted by the ALI, the Institute
had not completed its work on the reverse removal provision. Therefore, recommendations
on the Panel's composition address only the federal intrasystem transfer decisions of the
Panel. See id. § 3.02 cmt. d ("Because ...this Chapter calls for the Complex Litigation
Panel to handle cases under the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it should
continue to be composed of Article lI judges. Whether any additional special qualifications am required deserves further consideration."). It is unclear to what extent federalism
limitations may require or prohibit the alteration of the Institute's initial outlines of the
composition of the Panel. Compare Sessions, supra note 3, at 187 (COMPLEx LmGATION
PROJECT Reporter, Arthur R. Miller, acknowledging the "relationship" that exists between
state transferee courts under section 4.01 and the Panel and stating that when the ALI
"put[s] all these chapters together . .. [the] linkages .. . and the applications across the
aggregation devices will be made clearer.") with id.at 189 (Miller stating that "we rely
in this draft on the Complex Litigation Panel-a group of federal judges").
91. See COMPLEX LTGATION PROJEC, supra note 1, § 3.02 cmt. a.
92. See id.§ 3.02 cmt. a;see also Note, supra note 15, at 1040.
93. COMPLEX LITIGATION PRomEcr, supra note 1, § 3.02 cmL c.
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el, the Panel's work is a two step process. First, it must determine
whether an action meets Section 3.01's factor analysis and should
therefore be considered for transfer24 Once a case is considered
appropriate for transfer, the Panel is responsible for applying Section 3.04's factor analysis to determine which forum, if any, is the
best possible transferee court 5
E.

Reverse Removal Under Section 4.01

Although not explicitly recognized in Section 3.04, the ALI's
Complex Litigation Project authorizes a third form of transfer.
Broadly stated, the Panel could transfer certain federal actions to
state courts, a reversal of the typical notion of removal. This
"reverse removal" provision, proposed in Section 4.01, would allow
the transfer of federal cases to state courts "if the Panel determines
that fairness to the parties and the interests of justice will be materially advanced by transfer and subsequent consolidation of the
federal actions with other suits pending in the state court and that
the state court is superior to other possible transferee courts."'
Section 4.01 specifies four factors for determining whether a state
court should receive the federal action' These factors are the
94. See id. § 3.02.
95. rd.
96. Id.§ 4.01(a). The entire text of this section currently reads:
Subject to the exceptions in subsection (c), when determining under § 3.04
where to transfer and consolidate actions, the Complex Litigation Panel may
designate a state court as the tansferee court if the Panel determines that the
fairness to the parties and the interests of justice will be materially advanced
by transfer and consolidation of the federal actions with other suits pending in
the state court and that the state court is superior to other possible transferee
courts. Transfer under this section normally should not be ordered when the
federal actions are widely dispersed or they require a substantial degree of
individualized treatment. The Complex Litigation Panel may designate a state
court as the transferee court solely for pretrial proceedings, including discovery
and motion practice, or for the adjudication or common questions, or both. The
consent of the appropriate judicial authority in the state in which the designated
transferee court is located must be obtained. Once transfer is approved, a state
transferee court shall have the same powers and responsibilities as a federal
transferee court under § 3.06, and any assertion of authority by the state transferee court that is beyond the scope of its state power shall be exercised under
the general supervision of the Complex Litigation Panel.
Id
The general factors influencing the choice of a transferee court are provided by
Section 3.04 and require that the transferee court be capable of promoting the "just and
efficient' disposition of transferred cases as well as assuring "fairness" to the individual
litigants. Id § 3.04. Additionally, the Panel, in making that decision, is directed to give
great weight to considerations of convenience to the litigants. Id.
97. Id § 4.01(b). It should be noted that it is unclear whether the factors listed in
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proportion of cases dispersed among the two separate systems, the
number of states whose trial courts and federal district courts have
such actions pending, the state whose law is likely to govern, and
"any other factors indicating the need to accommodate a particular
state or federal interest.""8
The ALI explains that Section 4.01 is designed to "increase the
ability to promote efficient aggregated proceedings in the absence
of a formal legislative solution custom-tailored for the resolution of
disputes arising out of a particular set of circumstances." ' Reverse removal is designed to allow many cases which are spread
throughout the court systems to be consolidated even where the
factual circumstances of the cases do not allow consolidation under
other procedural statutes."W Reverse removal is an attempt to add
flexibility to the Complex Litigation Project by increasing the likelihood that multiparty, multiforum actions will be consolidated in
"the most rational and efficient forum possible."'"' By adding
Section 4.01 to the Complex Litigation Project, the ALI diverged
sharply from other complex litigation reform packages, which have
made single federal cases the magnet for consolidating large numbers of state actions in a single federal court. Smooth adjudication
of large cases under these other proposals may become hobbled by
a diseconomy in which the federal courts shoulder the entire burden of large numbers of state cases.'" In complex actions resulting from a single disastrous event, claims resting largely on substantive state law could be brought into the federal courts via diversity jurisdiction. Redirecting those claims to the state court for
consolidated trials preserves the adjudication of state issues in the
state courts and ensures that the states will continue their participation in the national complex litigation process despite the adoption
of a federal complex litigation reform package.0 3

section 4.01(b) are to be used to determine whether to transfer to a state court at all,

which state court should be designated as the transferee court, or both.
98. Id.

99. Id.§ 4.01.
100. Several statutes do permit the consolidation of fact specific cases. See LR.C. foil.
§ 7453, Rule 141 (West Supp. 1993) (providing for consideration of tax cases); Bankruptcy Rule 1015 (West Supp. 1993) (providing for consolidation of bankruptcy cases); 29
C.F.R. § 2200.9 (1987) (providing for consolidation of cases before the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission).
101. Co WLEx LMGATION PROJECr, supra note 1, ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. d.
102. See id.ch. 4, Intro. Note cmt. b.
103. See id. § 4.01 cmt. a.
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Thus, where a large number of actions are dispersed in the
state courts and are highly concentrated in a single state, while a
small number of claims have been filed in the federal courts, the
adjudication of those claims by a single state court would proceed
more quickly and with less cost to all judicial systems than if the
actions were consolidated separately within each system. The AL
uses the Hyatt Skywalk litigation' ° as an example of the benefits
of section 4 .0 1 .s By removing the federal claims to the Missouri
state court in which most of the claims were pending, section 4.01
would have consolidated these related cases in recognition that
most of 6the litigation was already taking place within that state
system.10
Though reverse removal in any form is a procedure wholly
unknown in American law,"° the ALI advances three constitutional arguments to support Congressional enactment of section
4.01. The ALI reasoned that federal jurisdiction can be restricted
by Congress' Article II powers to allocate judicial business among
the lower federal courts and state courts.' The ALI argues that
104. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
105. See COMPLEX Ln1GATION PROJECT, supra note 1.
106. See id.
107. See Sessions, supra note 3, at 188.
108. COMPLEX LrTGATION PROJECr, supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt. c. Article M11
states that
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § I.
As an aside, it should be noted that an argument has also been made that the judicial doctrine of abstention supports the constitutionality of section 4.01. See COMP.EX
LrTGATION PROJECTr, supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt a, illus. 2 (quoting Weinstein, supra note
12, at 24). Broadly speaking, the abstention doctrine allows federal courts in certain cases
to withdraw their jurisdictional power over the case. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 80.0, 813 (1976). The ALI relies on United States
District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein's management of asbestos cases, see In re Eastern
& Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380 (ED.N.Y. 1991), and earlier writings
on mass disaster litigation, see Weinstein, supra note 12, at 23-24 (explaining ways for
the federal court to send cases to state courts); Jack B. Weinstein, Coordination of State
and Federal Judicial Systems, 57 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1982) (explaining transfer
of litigation between state and federal systems), as support for the removal of federal
cases to state court.
Judge Weinstein argues that large disaster claims in the state courts do not benefit
from the progressive consolidation procedures offered by the currently existing Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Weinstein concludes that these cases should be afforded
more liberal use of, among other things, deferential abstention by the federal court from
exercising its jurisdiction. See Weinstein, supra note 12, at 23-24.
Weinstein avers to the ability of a federal court to abstain from hearing a case,
particularly as expressed by the Supreme Court in Colorado River. He argues that this
form of abstention could support the involuntary removal of federal cases to state courts.
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Congress could use this power to authorize the Complex Litigation

Panel to transfer certain federal cases to state courts.1 9 Concomitantly, the state court's capacity to hear the transferred matter" °
is supported by Congress' Supremacy Clause."' Conscious of the
In Colorado River, the Court recognized that there are circumstances in which it may be
wise for a federal court to refuse jurisdiction over an otherwise properly filed cause of
action. 424 U.S. at 814-17. Weinstein, and ultimately the ALI's CoMPLEx LI GATON
PRoJEcr, opts for a "'more direct and comprehensive approach."' COMPLEX LrrIAmnoN
PRoJEcT, supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt. a, illus. 2. (quoting Weinstein, supra note 12, at 24).
By relying on the abstention doctrine, the ALI advises that Congress use its Commerce
Clause and Supremacy Clause powers to enact regulatory provisions effecting the transfer
of single cases from various systems and jurisdictions into the court with the most interest
in the matter. Id.
This approach would have the effect of codifying the doctrine of abstention in circumstances that could have little to do with the purpose for its judicial creation. According to the Court in Colorado River, "the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a
federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise
judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for
abstention." 424 U.S. at 818.
Colorado River turned largely upon the traditional notion that piecemeal litigation is
to be avoided in disputes over property rights. Id. at 819-21. However, the class of cases
to which the ALI and Weinstein would apply involuntary removal do not generally implicate as strong a need to avoid piecemeal litigation as that found in property cases. The
involuntary removal of federal cases to state court under Section 4.01 of the COMPLEX
LTIATION PRojEcr would apply to any type of action where the majority of related
cases are found in a state's courts. In particular, both the ALI and Weinstein would have
transferred the federal claims in Skywalk Litigation and in certain asbestos actions to a
state court. In Colorado River, the dispersion of cases throughout the federal and state
systems involved the same property rights, 424 U.S. at 806, while the Skywalk Litigation
action, for instance, merely involved different tort claims against the same defendants, see
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
988 (1982). Additionally, the abstention doctrine is quite different from the reverse removal context because it assumes both parties are already litigating or have access to state
adjudication. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICnIN 657-74 (1989) (describing
how federal courts use abstention to avoid duplicative litigation).
109. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECr, supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt. a.
110. See id.
111. Although the most recent version of Section 4.01 has abandoned the argument, an
earlier ALI draft relied on the Commerce Clause to support congressional enactment of
Section 4.01. See COMPLEX LmGATION PROJECT § 5.08 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1989).
While some commentators have suggested that there is insufficient support in the proposal
to trigger Congress's commerce clause powers, their arguments are conclusory and do not
recognize that the adjudication of complex suits affects more than the parties to the litigation.
For instance, Linda S. Mullenix, in Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 187-89 (1990), questioned whether the commerce
clause can support Section 4.01. However, she provides no support or analysis of her
argument, merely stating that the ALI's analysis of reverse removal begs the question
whether Congress "has the constitutional authority to regulate federal court jurisdiction.. . by restricting it through involuntary inter-system transfers:' Id. at 188-89.
Congress's commerce clause power clearly supports Section 4.01's reverse removal.
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possibility that reverse removal may infringe on state sovereignty,"1 the Complex Litigation Project requires that the 3"appropriate
judicial authority" of the state consent to the transfer.
Because the state transferee court may be required to hear the
claims of plaintiffs who are citizens of other states, the ALI expands the jurisdictional reach of the state court to the limits of the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."' Rather than relying on the minimum-contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction
found in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment,"' the ALI recommends that state transferee courts
be granted broader jurisdictional powers limited by a national con-

In order for Congress's commerce clause power to apply, the regulated activity must affect the operation of interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding federal statute setting limit on intrastate wheat production); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding federal statute imposing minimum wage and maximum hours on manufacturers of goods shipped interstate). In the case of complex litigation, both courts and commentators have recognized that developments in complex litigation have national commercial and economic effect. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Liig., 829
F.2d 1233, 1235 (1987) ("More than 30,000 asbestos personal injury claims were filed
nationwide by 1986, and an additional 180,000 claims are projected to be on court dockets by the year 2010."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). The alarming number of
asbestos personal injury cases, see id., and the courts' struggle over the Agent Orange
litigation, see SHUCK, supra note 4, at 431 (estimated size of Agent Orange class action
was between 600,000 and 1.2 million persons, final settlement totalled $180,000,000), to
cite two examples, indicate that the private resolution of injuries has begun to spill over
into areas of national economic concern.
Concededly, these monstrous cases are not the norm. The more difficult cases for
justifying Congressional enactment of Section 4.01 on commerce clause grounds are the
smaller claims that would fall under the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT's scope. However,
Congress's commerce powers are broad enough to cover activities that appear remote from
interstate commerce. See 'Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (intrastate wheat production subject to federal statute under the commerce clause where national market in
wheat is dependent upon local wheat production). Additionally, given the ALI's proscription against employing Section 4.01 in all but the most necessary cases, see COMPLEX
LITIGATION PRoEC, supra note 1, ch. 4, Intro. Note cmt. d. ("[Tihe Complex Litigation
Panel will not order transfer and consolidation to a state's court unless it is quite convinced that doing so would provide a superior means of handling the controversy."), it is
unlikely that federal cases will be removed to state courts without a large number of
actions already pending in the state court system. Cf. id. § 4.01 cmt. e ("Indeed, transfer
of federal cases to state court should not be ordered unless state cases predominate').
112. See COMPLEX LIMIGATION PROJEcr, supra note 1, § 4.01 eiL b (stating that transfer will be "perceived as an encroachment on the authority of thQ state courts.").
113. See id.
114. See id. § 3.08 cmt. d.
115. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (allowing jurisdiction over a non-resident party because it had minimum contacts with the forum
state).
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tacts test." 6 Although the ALI articulates no precise formula for
determining whether particular litigants have sufficient contacts
with the United States to justify extending a transferee court's
jurisdiction over them, the Complex Litigation Project outlines an
analysis of the litigants' aggregation of contacts with the United
States and the fairness of requiring the parties to litigate in and
subject themselves to the judgment of a distant forum.' 7 According to the ALI, the test would be applied equally to both plaintiffs
and defendants because there is no reason to distinguish between
the relative burdens carried by the transferee plaintiff and the transferee defendant." "Both may oppose being moved to the magnet
forum and being compelled to participate in the consolidated proceeding; both are subject to the discovery and subpoena power of
the magnet court; both are 'present' in the litigation.""' 9
Noticeably absent from section 4.01 is a general grant of supervisory power to the Panel over the state transferee court. The earlier draft of section 4.01 endowed the Panel general supervisory" 2
or superintendency power2 1 over the state matter. This power
was intended to enable the state court to perform extraterritorial
functions like discovery and subpoena beyond the state boundaries. ' This power also had the implicit effect of preserving for
the federal litigants the federal status of their case. Although the
state court would not, by virtue of the transfer, be changed into a
federal court," the superintendency of the Panel was to have
supported the proceeding of the state trial court as a proceeding by
a body "acting as a national tribunal for the handling of complex
cases." 24 In its proposed final draft to the entire Institute, the
Complex Litigation Project drafters did not grant this authority to
the federal courts.
III.

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SECTION 4.01

The following section highlights four recommended revisions to

116. See COMPLEx LmGATION PRoIECr, supra note 1, § 3.08 cmt. d.
117. See id. § 3.08 cmt. f.
118. See id. § 3.08 Cmt. a, illus. 1.
119. Id.
120. See COMPLEX LmGATION PROJECr § 4.01(a) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1992) [hereinafter TENTAnvE DRAFr No. 3].
121. See Id. § 4.01 Cmt. f.
122. See Id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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Section 4.01 of the Complex Litigation Project. Each recommendation is followed by a brief explanation and illustration. The recommendations will be further evaluated and justified in part IV.
A. Determining the Transferee Court's Jurisdiction
over the Transferred Litigants
Section 4.01 should include an explicit articulation of the limits
of the state transferee court's personal jurisdiction over federal
litigants whose cases are removed to that court. The limits on the
state transferee court's personal jurisdiction should be measured by
weighing the hardship to the litigants in pursuing their cases in the
transferee court against the interests of the judiciary and the other
litigants in adjudicating the matter collectively.'"
This recommendation would fill in the personal jurisdiction gap
left by the ALl. Because reverse removal merely transfers the case
for consolidated trial in the state judiciary, it does not vitiate the
federal status of the case. The jurisdiction of the state court must,
therefore, be measured by federal standards. The Complex Litigation Project proposes only that the state transferee court's personal
jurisdiction cover all parties with nationwide contacts for whom
transfer would not be unfair.'" This proposal and the existing
case law on the matter are, however, unclear as to how fairness is
to be evaluated when determining federal court personal jurisdiction.'" Certain federal court cases abandon, or seem to abandon,
the traditional minimum contacts analysis employed in determining
state court jurisdiction over a defendant.'s Other federal courts
employ a modification of the traditional state court personal jurisdiction test.'" The result is that personal jurisdiction issues with
similar facts are decided inconsistently by the courts.
This result is unsatisfactory in the context of a national project
for complex litigation reform. The above recommendation is suggested because a uniform standard has not been forthcoming from

125. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
126. See COMPLEX LIIGATION PROJECr, supra note 1, § 3.08 & cmt. f. For a discussion of this requirement see supra notes 111-14 and infra notes 138-41.
127. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (Ist Cir.
1984) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment fairness analysis is not applicable to federal in personam jurisdiction). See also infra note 148 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th
Cir. 1984) (holding that federal district court jurisdiction requires a determination of unfair
burden to defendant). See also infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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the federal bench and has not been supplied by the ALI's Complex
Litigation Project.
B.

PersonalJurisdiction Analysis Specific to Federal Plaintiffs
Transferred to State Court

Reverse removal under Section 4.01 would remove the entire
case to the state transferee court. Therefore, personal jurisdiction of
the transferee court must extend to the plaintiff as well as the
defendant. Section 4.01 should be modified to include a presumption that the state court's personal jurisdiction over the federal
plaintiff will be satisfied by the plaintiff's minimum contacts with
the United States unless the plaintiff can show serious hardship in
pursuing the litigation in the transferee forum. 3
This recommendation runs contrary to the proposed version of
Section 4.01. There, the ALI recommends that the standard for
determining personal jurisdiction of the transferee court over the
plaintiff be applied equally to defendants as well as plaintiffs.'
The presence of the typical plaintiff in suits subject to the
Complex Litigation Project, however, differs significantly in its
impact on the litigation than does the presence of the typical defendant. Plaintiffs in consolidated actions benefit from protective
devices designed to facilitate collective litigation in distant fora.
Likewise, there is a growing understanding that a litigant's control
over his or her case is increasingly reduced as the case affects
other parties. Finally, limiting the transferee court's personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff to the same restrictions as those used for
the defendant would likely create several fragmented trials rather
than a single consolidated trial. For this reason, the ALI should
treat defendants and plaintiffs differently for personal jurisdiction
purposes.
C. The Appropriate JudicialAuthority as the Source
of Consentfor the Transfer
Section 4.01 should require that, before the federal Panel transfers the federal case to the state court, the highest court of the
transferee state must consent to the reverse removal.
The ALI has included in its blackletter portion of Section 4.01

130. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
131. See Cot.iEx LmGATION PRojEcr, supra note 1, § 3.08 cmt. f.
132. For a discussion of these justifications, see infra notes 173-91 and accompanying

19951

COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT

1157

a requirement that the Complex Litigation Panel receive consent of
the appropriate judicial authority in the state prior to effecting the
transfer of federal actions to that state.' The ALI, however, does
not specify which judicial authority is "appropriate" for granting
consent.
There appear to be three possible sources from which the Panel
could obtain consent: the state legislature, the state trial court, and
the state's court of last resort. The comments to Section 4.01 suggest that the Panel should seek consent from the state trial court

which is likely to receive the reverse removed action. However,
this option should be rejected. The state's highest court is recommended as the better source of consent because of its pivotal role
in the adjudicative branch of the state government. Likewise, because the state legislature may be quite removed from judicial
matters existing within its boundaries, this alternative is also reject-

ed.13

D. Ensuring Meaningful State Consent
Section 4.01 does not include a provision which would guarantee that the state's consent to the reverse removal would be meaningful. The ALI should, therefore, modify the consent provision to
read: "The consent of the appropriate judicial authority in the state
in which the designated transferee court is located must be obtained by the parties or by the Panel with active participation of
the parties.' 35
The ALI is justified in recommending that the Panel be permitted to condition its transfer of the federal actions on the state
court's adoption of certain federal procedures.'36 For instance, the
Panel may refuse to remove the federal case to the state trial court
if the state does not agree to follow certain federal discovery rules
notwithstanding the state's consent. Additionally, local and judicial
pressures specific to a given case may unduly influence the state to
grant consent to the transfer where it otherwise would not.'37 For
these reasons, adequate safeguards are necessary to prevent disregard for the litigants' interests. As it stands now, Section 4.01 does

133. See CoMPLEx LITIGATION PRoJEcr, supra note 1, § 4.01(a). For discussion of this

requirement, see supra notes 109-10 and infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
infra note 212 and accompanying text.
infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
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not provide any such safeguards. By including the litigants in the
consent process, the above recommendation is intended to guarantee that the state's consent is meaningful for all parties involved.
IV. EVALUATION-JUSTIFICAnONS FOR PROPOSED
REVISIONS TO SECTION

A.

4.01

Due Process Rights of Federal Plaintiffs in Transfer
Proceedings under Section 4.01

The following sections attempt to articulate the scope of personal jurisdiction in the transferee court and the relative applicability of that limit over plaintiffs and defendants. Although the process
given to a party prior to the transfer withstands Fifth Amendment
criticism while best meeting the goals of the Complex Litigation
Project, the ALI's requirement of personal jurisdiction in the transferee court should be clarified to address the current confusion in
the federal courts over the Fifth Amendment due process limitations on personal jurisdiction. Likewise, the standards for determining personal jurisdiction of the transferee court over plaintiffs
should not be as demanding as that used for determining personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.
1. Jurisdictional Reach of the State Transferee Court
In order to exercise power over litigants beyond the traditional
reach of state courts,' the ALI Complex Litigation Project proposes legislation that extends a state court's personal jurisdiction to
the limits of the Fifth Amendment due process clause for actions
transferred to it under the proposed federal statute."9 The per-

138. The traditional reach of state court personal jurisdiction is generally articulated in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring defendants in
state court to have minimum contacts "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.") (citing Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). For a discussion of the application of International Shoe's
minimum contacts test in the context of state long-arm statutes, see generally Lea
Brilimayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77.
139. See COMPLEX LTIGATION PROiEcT, supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt. f. Referring to Section 3.01's national contacts test for personal jurisdiction, comment f states that
"[n]ationwide service of process for complex litigation would be under the command of a
federal statute and not simply an assertion of state power. Thus, it would not be limited
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but would be controlled by the
Fifth Amendment." That Congress can expand the jurisdiction of the state courts in complex cases is not seriously in dispute. See supra note 108.
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sonal jurisdiction of state transferee courts would reach parties who

have minimum contacts with the United States and for whom
transfer to the state court would not be unfair as provided in Sec4 This jurisdictional
tion 3.08 of the Complex Litigation Project."
standard is based on the personal jurisdiction of federal courts."'
Although the jurisdictional standard proposed in the Complex

Litigation Project is consistent with Fifth Amendment due process
standards, the ALI should explicitly articulate the standard in the
proposal's black letter statement because neither the Supreme Court
nor the lower federal courts have been able to settle on a precise
definition of Fifth Amendment due process requirements for federal
court personal jurisdiction." Section 3.08 does not specifically
define the proposed national contacts test and the comments following Section 3.08, while helpful, are, in some instances, too
general, and in others, wholly unclear as to how the fairness requirement should be applied. Moreover, the ALI Complex Litigation Project, like the lower federal courts, seems unable to distin-

guish clearly between the personal jurisdiction test proposed for the
complex litigation context and that enunciated by the Supreme
Court in cases disputing state court jurisdiction.'43

140. See COMPLEX LITIGAIION PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.08 & cmt. f.
141. See 1d. § 4.01 cmt. f. "Because complex litigation is, by definition, a national
phenomenon, state transferee courts can be effective partners in handling it only if they
are able to exert the same nationwide jurisdiction as do their federal counterparts." Id.
142. This standard is recommended for use when transferring litigants to a state court.
The specific application of this standard to certain plaintiffs will be treated later. See infra
notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
143. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Complex Litigation Project goes so far as to analogize the fairness requirement in the nationwide
contacts test with that required to establish state court jurisdiction over a defendant without indicating their points of difference. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 1,
§ 3.08 cmt. e ("Thus, just as an analysis of state contacts and fairness are pertinent to
the decision of whether a particular assertion of jurisdiction violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, reference to national contacts and fairness appears to be proper for determining whether Fifth Amendment constraints are satisfied."). For an analysis of the arguments
distinguishing between in personam jurisdiction in the state and federal courts, see Robert
Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of PersonalJurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 58 INn. LJ. 1, 33 (1982) (arguing that federal court personal jurisdiction
be reduced to a strict national contacts test), Maryellen Fullerton, ConstitutionalLimits on
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L.REV. 1, 85 (1984)
(arguing that federal court personal jurisdiction requires regional contacts and fairness
based on inconvenience, anticipation, and national interest) and David S.Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The FederalInterest in PersonalJurisdiction, 56 FORDHAm L. REV. 1,
25-26 (1987) (proposing a threshold test for national interest before overriding a
defendant's interest in resisting jurisdiction, coupled with a balancing test to determine
whether the defendant's interest outweighs that of the government).
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A detailed analysis of Section 3.08 justifies the recommended
revision of the Complex Litigation Project's jurisdiction analysis

when the language of that section is read in the context of the
courts' and commentators' dispute over personal jurisdiction in the
federal courts. Section 3.08 states that "the transferee court may
exercise jurisdiction over any parties to those actions [transferred
and consolidated by the Complex Litigation Panel] ... to the full
extent of the power conferrable on a federal court by the United
States Constitution.""
Thus, the Complex Litigation Project

would provide a federal statute for nationwide personal jurisdiction
similar to many existing federal statutes.'4 The Supreme Court
has not yet determined the jurisdictional reach of the federal district courts. When faced with the issue, the Court, in Stafford v.
Briggs,'" decided the case on other grounds. However, Justice
Stewart's dissent analyzed the Fifth Amendment issue, and argued
that the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Fifth Amendment is to be determined solely on the basis of the defendant's
contacts with the United States. Stewart wrote:
The issue is not whether it is unfair to require a defendant

The ALI recognizes that a nationwide contacts test coupled with a determination of
fairness in the transfer of a litigant "enlarge[s] the existing personal jurisdiction power of
the federal courts." COMPlEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.08 cmt. f. As a
general rule, the federal courts' in personam jurisdiction is limited by the long-arm statutes of the states in which they sit. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (allowing process to be served
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by state law). Both the Judicial
Code and some state statutes, however, allow nationwide service of process. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. §§ 1655, 2361 (1988); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.40 (West 1973).
144. COMPLEX LmGATION PROECr, supra note 1, § 3.08.
145. Certain federal statutes either provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction or provide
for nationwide service of process which is then interpreted by the courts to intend nationwide personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Power Ass'n v. L.K. Comstock & Co.,
No. 3-89 CIV 766, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18874, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 1992) (construing nationwide service of process provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), as providing for nationwide personal jurisdiction);
Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Distrib. Carriers,
Inc., No. 92 C 2411, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11974, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1992) (construing nationwide service of process provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), as authorizing nationwide personal jurisdiction); Collier v. Stuart-James Co. No. 89 Civ. 5805, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4896, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.,
April 26, 1990) (construing nationwide service of process provisions in the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(v), as authorizing for nationwide personal jurisdiction). But see
Abrams, supra note 143, at 9 ("[Niumerous provisions in the Judicial Code . . . are used
to claim power over a defendant with minimal contact with the forum district,... [such
an] assertion of federal personal jurisdiction is not self-evidently correct.").
146. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
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to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether the court of a particular sovereign
has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named
defendant. The cases before us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts of the United
States. No due process problem exists.'47
Without any controlling authority on the matter, the lower
federal courts have been divided in their analyses of personal jurisdiction over cases brought to them under a federal statute. The
federal circuits are in conflict as to whether or not the Fifth
Amendment requires a court to determine the fairness of exercising
personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Federal courts that do
apply a fairness analysis look to different relations between the
defendant and the forum than those required when state courts
exercise personal jurisdiction.'49

147. Id.at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
148. Compare Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1984) (finding that defendant came within the court's jurisdiction and holding that Fourteenth Amendment fairness analysis is not applicable to federal in personam jurisdiction;
defendant need only have sufficient contacts with the United States) with Handley v.
Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that federal
district court jurisdiction requires determination of unfair burden to defendant and finding
that defendant is not unfairly burdened) and Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255,
259 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires a fairness determination
such that defendant that was aware of product placed by third parties in forum state
could anticipate that it would be sued in forum state and finding that extension of court's
jurisdiction over defendant would not be unfair).
However, current cases suggest that the federal courts, at least where the underlying
statute provides nationwide service of process, view minimum contacts with the United
States as sufficient determination of fairness under the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United
Power, at *4-5 (holding that R.I.C.O. statute 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) creates nationwide jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is proper where party has minimum contacts with the United
States), Central States, at *1 (holding that minimum contacts with the United States is
adequate for nationwide jurisdiction under E.RLS.A., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2)); Hazel v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. IP 86-909-C, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8416 at *9 (S.D. Ind.
May 15, 1990) (finding that Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns arising in E.R.LS.A.
claims are satisfied by minimum contacts with the United States); Collier, at *2 (holding
that minimum contacts with the United States are sufficient for personal jurisdiction in
federal securities claims and R.I.C.O. actions). But see First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n of Pittsburgh, v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 634 F. Supp. 1341, 1345
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting the notion that nationwide service of process requires a subsequent constitutional analysis of jurisdiction and requiring only reasonable notice to satisfy
service of process requirement).
149. In Handley, for instance, the Sixth Circuit stated in dicta that a Fifth Amendment
due process analysis "is different from one undertaken under the Fourteenth Amendment"
to the extent that the minimum contacts analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment "'acts
to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
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Notwithstanding this confusion, the comments following the
blackletter prescription of Section 3.08 provide no more than general outlines as to when a party falls within the personal jurisdiction of the transferee court. Where the litigant whose case is to be
transferred is not a resident of the United States, the AL recommends that the Panel consider the litigant's aggregate contacts with

the United States and the interests of the judicial system, the transferee court, and the claimants in transferring the party to the state
court.' Under this analysis, a foreign plaintiff could be brought

under the jurisdictional power of the state court notwithstanding the
fact that the litigant may not be subject to the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment jurisdictional analysis. To do otherwise, the ALI

argues, would leave claims against that party with no proper forum
for adjudication.' Where the litigant is a resident of the United
States (whose contacts with the United States are not in question),

the Complex Litigation Project merely suggests that determining
the fairness of transferring that litigant to a distant state forum
involves consideration of the facts and circumstances of the litigation and the distance between the litigant and the transferee fo-

rum."' Under this analysis, actual hardship to the litigant is recommended as the controlling factor.'53

on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.'" 732 F.2d at 1271
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)). The court
held, however, that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment concerns whether or not "the district court's assertion of jurisdiction unfairly
burden[s]" the defendant. Id. Thus, where the defendant was a non-resident corporation
carrying on "substantial and more or less continuous" business with the forum state, the
defendant is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the federal court. Id. at 1272. The
defendant's contacts with the forum state primarily involved passing through Kentucky
waters while travelling on the Ohio River. After holding that jurisdiction was properly extended over the defendant, the Sixth Circuit added that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to
diminish the effectiveness of legislation having national scope" Id. Because the jurisdictional significance of the contacts in this case were questionable, this quote may indicate
that the Sixth Circuit is merely relaxing the fairness standard applied under a Fourteenth
Amendment in state court personal jurisdiction case.
The Third Circuit, in Home, applied a Fifth Amendment due process test that parallels the fairness test of the Fourteenth Amendment more closely than that in Handley.
There, the court refers to "traditional notions of fairness" to conclude that a manufacturer
is subject to the personal jurisdiction of a distant federal court where a known bootleg
market placed its products in the forum state and those products violated a valid patent.
Home, 684 F.2d at 260.
150. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.08 cmt. f.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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Courts may find it difficult to apply these standards to complex
cases. Imagine, for instance, that the parties whose circumstances
gave rise to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 54 were in
litigation not for a two-car crash, but for a collision between the
Robinsons, the drivers of a car purchased in from the defendants in
New York, and a charter bus carrying sixty Oklahoma elementary
school children. Imagine that the defective tank which caused the
fire in Woodson, also injured the children on the charter bus. All
the plaintiffs, the Robinsons, and the children's parents filed actions against all four defendants in the Oklahoma state court. The
defendants were the automobile manufacturer, Audi; the importer,
Volkswagen of America, Inc.; the regional distributor, World-Wide
Volkswagen; and its retail dealer, Seaway. Before the Oklahoma
court can consolidate all the actions, the regional distributor and
the retail dealer file special appearances challenging the Oklahoma
state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over them on the
grounds that they had no contacts with the Oklahoma except for
the presence of the Robinson's car.
Under Woodson, these two defendants would prevail, thereby
forcing the plaintiffs to file suit in federal court, using diversity
jurisdiction. However, the federal court in diversity is prohibited
from extending its personal jurisdiction over parties that could not
be served in the manner provided by the state in which it sits."5
Plaintiffs would then be required to bring their actions in a federal
diversity court sitting in a state with which World-Wide Volkswag-

154. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Woodson involved a collision between an Audi, purchased
from the defendants by Harry and Kay Robinson in New York, and another automobile.
The accident caused a fire which severely burned Ms. Robinson and her two children.
The Robinsons alleged that the defective design and placement of the gas tank and fuel
system caused the explosion. See id. at 288.
155. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), was the pivotal
case on the issue of personal jurisdiction of federal courts sitting in diversity. In that
case, Judge Friendly stated, "a federal district court will not assert jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation in an ordinary diversity case unless that would be done by the state
court under constitutionally valid state legislation in the state where the court sits ... :'
lIdat 222. For more recent cases dealing with this issue, see Mariner v. Hyatt Corp.,
Civ. No. 90-464 ACK, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16570, at *2-4 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 1990)
(holding that acts of defendant including national advertising and operation of world-wide
toll-free reservation system are sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts requirement); Tropea
v. Rogers-Tropea Inc., No.89-0275B, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12697, at *7-8 (D.RI. Sept.
10, 1990) (holding that merely advertising in national magazines does not establish minimum contacts with the forum); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (requiring federal court to
adopt the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits where the cases before it presents
no federal statute providing a rule for service of process).
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en and Seaway have sufficient minimum contacts.
Under the Complex Litigation Project's Section 4.01, the plaintiffs could petition to reverse this federal diversity action to an
Oklahoma state trial court for consolidated treatment because nationwide personal jurisdiction of the state courts is authorized under
Section 3.08. Given the defendants' business contacts, the federal
diversity action would be located somewhere near New York or
New Jersey. However, the Complex Litigation Panel could transfer
the action to an Oklahoma trial court if the Fifth Amendment test
for an Oklahoma federal court's personal jurisdiction extends to
defendants in New York.
Notwithstanding this odd twist, the standards recommended by
the ALI for determination of jurisdiction may lead to inconsistent
results. Discrepancies between cases could turn on the breadth with
which the Panel could measure the federal interest in consolidating
the action and how closely the Panel parallels its analysis to that
used under the Fourteenth Amendment. Using an analysis similar
to that in Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,'5 the federal interest in consolidating the action by lightening federal docket
pressures by eliminating cases which may duplicate cases taking
place in the Oklahoma court could convince the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the New York defendants. In Handley, the contacts of the defendant with the federal court's state were at best insubstantial and not specific to the litigation.'" The Sixth Circuit,
however, upheld the fairness of exercising federal court jurisdiction
largely because "[tio hold otherwise would be to diminish the
effectiveness of legislation having national scope."'58 Likewise,
the convenience to the plaintiffs and the federal interest in efficiency may outweigh whatever burden the New York defendants would
face by being required to travel to Oklahoma to litigate their cases.
Considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the litigation,
as the ALI recommends, leads to the conclusion that the federal
case should be reverse removed to an Oklahoman trial court. The
judicial system and the majority of the parties to the complex
action would be more burdened by requiring more than sixty plaintiffs to raise their cases in a distant forum. If the cases were con-

156. 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984).
157. See id. at 1271. The relevant contacts of the defendant with the forum state involved travelling through the forum state's waters on the Ohio River and stopping from

time to time at ports in the forum state to take on "fuel and stores." Id.
158. Id. at 1272.
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solidated in Oklahoma, only two defendants would be required to
travel to litigate their cases. Moreover, the two judicial systems
would not be deciding duplicative cases if the actions were consolidated in a single court.
On the other hand, applying the Section 3.08 standards under
the Third Circuit's definition of fairness in De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.'59 would result in an opposite conclusion. In
that case, the defendant, a ship repair company located in Japan,
was held not subject to the district court's in personam jurisdiction
because its only contact with the forum state was the ship it repaired on which the plaintiff's accident took place."* The Third
Circuit emphasized that the contacts with the forum state were not
such that the defendant had in any way benefitted from the laws of
that state.' Application of the district court's jurisdiction to the
defendant would therefore, the court reasoned, be unfair.' The
De James court clearly applied a fairness standard to assertions of
personal jurisdiction in federal courts that matches the standards
applied under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the admiralty
nature of the suit would have given the court an opportunity to
assert the presence of a national interest, the court opted in favor
of a narrower application of Fourteenth Amendment standards."
Under this reasoning, then, the plaintiffs in the modified-Woodson
hypothetical would be unable to bring the New York defendants
within the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma transferee court.
It is clear from this comparison that the existing confusion over
the Fifth Amendment due process standard to be applied in federal
court personal jurisdiction cases would result in confusion over
whether a state transferee court could extend jurisdiction over a
party under the ALI's expression of the Fifth Amendment jurisdiction standard. A more specific articulation of the standards for
fairness that determine jurisdiction under Section 3.08 is necessary
if the ALI's reverse removal provision can be exercised constitutionally. The Complex Litigation Project should require, when
inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding litigation, a
159. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
160. See id. at 286.
161. See id. at 285.
162. See id.at 286.
163. See Ud But see id. at 292 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("iThe applicable constitutional
due process provision should not be the fourteenth amendment, but the fifth amendment ....
[which] requires only that the forum be a fair and reasonable place at which
to compel defendant's appearance.").

1166

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEWV4

(V/ol. 44.1129

determination of how the actual hardship to the litigant measures
up against the interest of the judiciary and other litigants in processing the claims separately.
Weighing the interests of adjudication against the convenience
of the litigant is not a revolutionary technique for determining the
due process limitations of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts reminds us that the limit of due
process protection for personal jurisdiction depends upon the
"'quality and nature of the [litigant's] activity [in the forum state]
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws."64

Determining fairness by comparing the hardship of the transfer
to the litigant to the overall judicial interest in conveniently and
efficiently adjudicating the dispute fits naturally into current practice. It is interesting to note that the currently existing Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation does not inquire into the personal
jurisdiction of the transferee court."e The inquiry, once common
issues of fact and law are established, concerns convenience to all
parties and witnesses, and the purposes of just and efficient adjudication."e Prior to coining the oft-quoted admission that this barebones interpretation of Section 1407 is the result of a "worm's eye
view of Section 1407," Judge Wisdom wrote:
Of course it is to the interest of each plaintiff to have all
of the proceedings in his suit handled in his district. But
the Panel must weigh the interests of all the plaintiffs and
all the defendants, and must consider multiple litigation as
a whole in the light of the purposes of the law.'6

164. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806 (1985) (quoting International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (emphasis added). The reiteration of
this relational inquiry is used by the Court to explain the foundation of a litigant's liberty

interest in legitimately challenging litigation in a distant forum. See id.
165. In Freedman v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 399 F. Supp. 1397 (J.P.M.L. 1975), the
defendant challenged the transfer as a violation of its fifth amendment due process rights
because the defendant had insufficient contacts for exercise of personal jurisdiction. In
response, the Panel stated, "We have considered this constitutional argument and find it
without merit" Id. at 1400.
166. This inquiry is a result of the plain language of the multidistrict litigation statute.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988); see also DAViD F. HERR, MuLTmlSratcr LrnGtrmoN,
§ 5.2 (1988) (discussing convenience of parties and efficient conduct as statutory criteria
for transfers).
167. In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Litig. Involving Library Editions of
Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (J.P.M.L. 1968). This statement was the court's
response to plaintiffs' argument that their limited means should persuade the Panel from
authorizing the transfer. Id.
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Along a more specific line of reasoning, Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his opening remarks to the 1992 Proceedings of the
ALI, stated:
Particularly in areas such as bankruptcy or some kinds of
mass tort litigation, when transactional costs are, economically speaking, directly subtracted from the gross amount
available to compensate litigants who establish their claims,
entry into the judicial system, choice of forum within that
system, and exit from the system will probably have to be
regulated in ways largely unknown and perhaps unacceptable, 168at least in the past and perhaps at the present
time.

Finally, as Professor David S. Welkowitz argued, "the interests
of the state in asserting its authority to force the defendant to
litigate in the state substitute for the 'contacts' analysis" used in
Supreme Court decisions determining a state court's personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.'69 By examining the hardship of
the transfer to the litigant in terms of the competing interests in
adjudicating the dispute collectively, the Complex Litigation Panel
can adopt a more consistent due process analysis than that already
used by the federal courts.
2. Determining Jurisdiction over the Plaintiff
According to Section 3.08 of the ALI Complex Litigation Project, the due process standard used to determine whether the
transferee court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff is the same as
that used for transfer of a defendant: nationwide minimum contacts
plus the requirement that transfer would be fair to the party under
the facts and circumstances of the litigation. 7 ' The application of
the same due process standard for plaintiffs as for defendants, however, is not constitutionally necessary and may, in certain circum168. Tuesday Morning Session, 69 A.L.. PRoc. 5 (1992) (remarks of Chief Justice
Rehnquist).
169. Welkowitz, supra note 143, at 26. But cf Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The "Forum State
Interest" Factor in Personal JurisdictionAdjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Con-

stitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769 (1982) (arguing that fairness to parties rather
than forum state interest is benchmark of jurisdiction analysis). Welkowitz uses this argument to support the conclusion that federal court personal jurisdiction should include a
threshold determination of federal governmental interest prior to inquiring into the fairness
of exercising power over a defendant.
170. See CoM=c LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.08 cimt. a, illus. 1. For a
discussion of this standard, see supra note 115-16 and accompanying text.
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stances, prevent the transfer of cases where transfer is most needed

to ensure efficiency. The ALI should adopt a less rigid standard of
due process to determine whether jurisdiction of the transferee

court applies to plaintiffs. Where plaintiffs from across the country
are involved in the litigation, different burdens are placed on each

of them. A complex case involving these plaintiffs may create the
possibility that, rather than consolidate the case, intersystem transfer

would result in the creation of smaller actions located at several
centralized fora.' A less rigid application of the fairness determination would ensure that efficiency gains will be realized where
they are most needed.
To this end, the ALI's blackletter statement should include a

provision that jurisdiction of the state transferee court over the
federal plaintiff will be satisfied by virtue of the national interest
in transfer unless the plaintiff can show serious hardship in pursuing the litigation at the site of the transferee forum. This standard

is ultimately based on the growing assumption that society as a
whole may have greater interest in an individual's case than has

been traditionally recognized. This is to say civil litigation between
private parties may no longer be seen in terms of the private enforcement of personal rights. Such cases have an impact beyond

the individual litigant and may therefore contain certain societal
interests."

171. The analogous transfer power currently existing, that of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988), has been functioning without clear
limits on the transferred plaintiffs' due process rights. See HERm, supra note 166, § 3.5.
Cf. Freedman v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 399 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (quoting the Judicial Panel's articulation of the jurisdictional limits on its transfer authority).
172. The Supreme Court, in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), after acknowledging
that the judgment of a court does not generally apply to "strangers" to the action, "recognized,' in a footnote, "an exception to the general rule when, in certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party." Id. at 762 n.2. According to the Court, this
exception permits "legal proceedings [to]terminate preexisting rights if the scheme is
otherwise consistent with due process." Id. The Court, however, declined to give examples
that would be "consistent with due process."
Along a similar vein, Judith Resnik writes:
By phrases such as the "asbestos litigation" and the "Savings and Loan litigation," we link individuals and their interests with the image that courts and
lawyers could and should interact with such a "litigation' as an interrelated
whole. The primacy of the individual in relation to her or his own case has
declined.
Resnik, supra note 1, at 51-52; see also Deborah R. Hensler, Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation Issues in Mass Tort Litigation: Resolving Mass Torts: Myths and Realities,
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The ALI reaches its conclusion that plaintiffs should be subject
to the same jurisdictional standards as defendants through a narrow
reading of Phillips Petroleum Co. v.Shutts."' In its only analysis
of the issue, the Complex Litigation Project determined that plaintiffs in complex litigation are sufficiently distinct from those in
class actions to merit due process protection equal to that of defendants:
The crux of the Court's analysis was a comparison of the
relative burdens of litigation imposed upon the parties.
Applying the same general analysis to complex litigation,
there is no reason to distinguish between transferee defendants and transferee plaintiffs. Both may oppose being
moved to the magnet forum and being compelled to participate in the consolidated proceeding; both are subject to the
discovery and subpoena power of the magnet court; both
are "present" in the litigation. The inevitable conclusion
seems to be that the transferee court should apply the same
personal jurisdiction analysis to unwilling plaintiffs and
defendants alike.' 74
The ALI may have overlooked the fact that more often than not
there are more plaintiffs in these cases than there are defendants,
and that the plaintiffs may be spread throughout the nation. 5
Likewise, the ALI failed to recognize that where there are large
numbers of plaintiffs in consolidated cases, the plaintiffs are not
subject to the same burdens as the defendant. The Court in Shutts
examined, more closely than the ALI, the relative burdens that
place plaintiffs and defendants in class actions on different footing

1989 U. ILL L. REV. 89, 89-90 ("[A] consensus has now emerged calling for substantial

modifications in traditional court processes to improve the efficiency and equity of the
mass claims resolution process.); Yeazell, supra note 1, at 45 (stating that in collective
litigation "[tihe lawsuit is no longer tailor-made to the litigant's (or to the lawyer's conception of the litigant's) interest; it represents instead an amalgamation of the litigant's
interest with that of others"). But cf Transgrud, Dissent, supra note 4, at 76 ("Large
numbers of plaintiffs and defendants often create a matrix of cross-claims, a web of
choice-of-law issues, and a host of peripheral and satellite litigation that would never exist
if the claims had been tried separately.").
173. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
174. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.08 cmt. a, illus. 1.
175. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(noting over 150 plaintiffs); In re Northern District of California Dalkon Shield LU.D.
Products Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (NJD. Cal. 1981) (over 1,500 claims filed
nationwide against single manufacturer).
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for due process purposes. '76 Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court in Shutts, considered eight, roughly distinct characteristics
of the circumstances of absent plaintiffs in a class action that the
absent plaintiffs' claims are pooled, that the absent plaintiffs are
not required to hire a lawyer, that the structure of the lawsuit
affords protection of the absent plaintiffs' interests, that the absent
plaintiffs are not "haled" into a forum "upon pain of a default
judgment," and that the absent plaintiffs are not likely to be involved in counterclaims or cross-claims, will not be liable for fees
or court costs, and are not subject to coercive or punitive remedies
of the court." The Court then contrasted these circumstances
with the burdens carried by the defendant. The defendant must hire
a lawyer, will be required to travel, will suffer default judgment if
no appearance is made, and is subject to discovery orders, damages, and other remedies issued by the presiding judge."8 The common thread of the Court's analysis was the measure of the protection afforded to absent plaintiffs by the representative structure of
class actions. The result of the Court's analysis was that absent
plaintiffs in class actions need not satisfy the minimum contacts
test for personal jurisdiction of the trial court, but can be bound by
a court's rulings where they have notice, an opportunity to be
heard and participate in the litigation, and an opportunity to "opt
out" of the litigation.'79
The distinctions between plaintiff and defendant in the Shutts
analysis hinge on the representative nature of class action suits and
are equally applicable to the opportunities available to plaintiffs
transferred under the Complex Litigation Project. The Complex
Litigation Project, drafted to "follow the general approach" used in
transfers by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,"' is
more comparable to class action as analyzed in Shutts than it is to
adjudication of single party disputes. The procedures used in complex cases transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation are similar to those that protect absent plaintiffs in class action
suits. The Manual for Complex Litigation authorizes transferee
courts to encourage parties with similar interests to select counsel
to act as liaison between the court and the lawyers for the individ-

176.
177.
178.
179.

See
See
See
See

Shuits, 472 U.S. at 807-11.
id.
id.
id. at 812.

180. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, ch. 3, Intro. Note cmt. b.
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ual parties in the consolidated action.' The Manual also authorizes the judge to encourage parties with similar interests to select
lead counsel to handle pre-trial motion practice on behalf of a
group of parties with common interests." Although not free of
the burden of hiring a lawyer or fending for themselves, plaintiffs
consolidated according to the approaches used in federal,
multidistrict litigation enjoy more protection of their interests than
do the plaintiffs in single party lawsuits.
Plaintiffs in consolidated cases are also similar to absent plaintiffs in class actions because both courts presiding over consolidated cases and courts presiding over class actions emphasize the
individual plaintiffs' common interests and follow rules that create
incentives for the plaintiffs' attorneys to work together. In order for
plaintiffs to consolidate actions under the Complex Litigation Project, their cases must share common issues of fact." Likewise, in
current practice, multidistrict litigation has assured that transfer and
consolidation will take place where individual issues do not predominate.' 84 As in a class action suit, the consolidation of cases
occurs in the context of structural devices designed to encourage

attorneys for one side of an action to work toward the common

181. See MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.90. See also Rando v. Luckenbach SS. Co., 25
F.R.D. 483, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding that it is proper for the court to appoint liaison
counsel to supervise discovery in action involving approximately 500 plaintiffs and 200
attorneys).
182. See MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.92 (5th ed. 1982) ("Such counsel brief and argue
motions, file opposing briefs in pretrial proceedings initiated by other parties, prepare
proposed written interrogatories, initiate and conduct proceedings and motions for production and inspection of documents, and conduct the examination of witnesses in depositions
on oral interrogatories .... "); see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades,
549 F.2d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that judges have power to appoint and rely
on lead counsel to handle pre-trial activity in complex litigation where interests of coparties coincide).
183. See COMPLmX LmAT1ON PRomcr, supra note 1, § 3.01. The ALI did not adopt
the standard used in class actions, which requires a predominance of common issues, because this standard is more restrictive and "[noncommon questions may be severed and
remanded to the transferor courts for individual treatment when appropriate:' Id. § 3.01
cmt. C.
184. See Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 118 F.R.D. 440, 441 (NJD. 111.
1987) (denying motion to consolidate civil rights cases on the ground that individual
issues predominated); Hasman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 106 F.R.D. 459, 461 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (refusing to consolidate tort cases where individual issues would make joint trial
confusing and unmanageable). Although the federal cases on consolidation are interpretations of Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the same concern for manageability and reduction in duplicative litigation is present in the comments to the ALI's
standard for consolidation. See COMPLEX LITGATON PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.01
cmt. a.
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goal of furthering the interests of that side in addition to the interests of their individual clients." As Rehnquist observed of absent
plaintiffs in class actions, the parties to consolidated litigation are
protected by the "undoubted power and inescapable duty" of the
trial judge to control the procedures of the complex case so that its
outcome will be reached efficiently and fairly.'86 Current approaches to consolidation under the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation parallel all the significant features of class action, with

the exception that individual litigants remain separate and separately represented." 7 In contrast, these protective devices are not given to the single plaintiff in instances of simple litigation.
It is conceded that plaintiffs transferred under the ALI Complex

Litigation Project are not as distinct from defendants as are the
absent class plaintiffs in Shutts. Like the Shutts defendants, complex litigation plaintiffs have to hire lawyers, be required to travel,
and will suffer default judgment if they fail to appear.' Howev-

er, plaintiffs in consolidated actions are distinct from defendants in
other respects. In most of the cases falling under Section 4.01,
plaintiffs will not be expected to pay damages to either the defen-

dant or to other plaintiffs. Most of the actions would involve large
accident cases where the majority of individuals file in state court
and the issues before the court are liability in tort. Plaintiffs will,

therefore, not be likely to subject each other to cross-claims and
will not likely be subject to counterclaims by the defendant.
However, plaintiffs may argue that regardless of the protective
devices given to them and overall benefits received by everyone

185. It has been argued that federal consolidation under Rule 42 is superior to class
action for ensuring cooperation because of the contract based nature of the relationship
between the lead counsel, individual clients' attorneys, and the client themselves. See
Silver, supra note 66, at 505 ("[Ihe need to define adequate representation and the prospect of underrepresentation disappear because consolidations are not representational
suits . .. . Second, the likelihood of agency failures falls because . . . [parties] use contracts and the threat of discharge to create institutional structures that govern their individual suits.'.
186. See MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.10.
187. See Silver, supra note 66, at 497 ("Because a consolidation is a set of independent
lawsuits, it cannot properly be characterized as a representational suit in which a lead party stands on behalf of everyone else."); Cf., Resnik, supra note 1, at 47 (arguing that
consolidation under the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation does not convey the
appearance of enabling litigants to litigate like class action); Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1988) ("[A]ctions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings:) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all . . .
188. See Shutts, 472 U.S., at 812.
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involved in the litigation, the transfer burdens them as equally as it
burdens the defendant, and that they should therefore, be afforded
the same due process rights in determining personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs can point to the cost in having to litigate in a distant
forum as support for this conclusion. Their cost would, theoretically, be the same as that of a defendant residing in the same location. Plaintiffs can also argue that they should not be penalized by
suffering a lower due process standard for properly seeking enforcement of their legal rights.
This challenge merely underscores the conclusion that plaintiffs
transferred and consolidated under Section 4.01 should not be
treated with the same due process standard as that of absent members of a plaintiff class. It does not, however, lead to the conclusion that plaintiffs, in a Section 4.01 transfer, require the same
level of due process as defendants.
The challenge, however, does go to the heart of the issue of a
litigant's control over his or her case. Procedural practice today
suggests that, in the context of collective litigation, the litigant's
autonomy may have to be subordinated to other, overarching issues.8 9 Ultimately, the fact that a plaintiff's interests are initially
harmed by the same transaction or occurrence that caused harm to
others minimizes the amount of control that a plaintiff may have in
seeking a remedy for that harm. The societal need to reach a common resolution for all the injuries caused by the defendant mandates that the claims of the multiple plaintiffs be heard together."° Where the due process rights of plaintiffs prevent transfer
for consolidated trial, these procedural rights frustrate the overriding societal need to achieve a common resolution of claims based
on the same transaction or occurrence.
Under the Complex Litigation Project, adjudicating plaintiffs
cannot be characterized as mere plaintiffs in the traditional sense,

189. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
190. See Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LMG. 231, 248-51 (1991) (discussing tailoring class actions to allow individual attorneys to perform functions for consolidated litigation). See also David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 859 (1984) (arguing that aggregative methods of
adjudication are supported by the interests of substantive tort law). Rosenberg's argument
that fact-finders will undervalue a plaintiff's claim when heard individually as opposed to
the value of common claims heard collectively adds force to the argument that a
plaintiff's convenience in litigating where he or she chooses is legitimately outweighed by
interests of justice.
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but must be seen in terms of their relationship to other plaintiffs in
related actions, the judicial systems in which they bring their disputes, and any litigants with claims not yet filed. As Edward F.
Sherman writes, "[tIoday, litigant autonomy has to be viewed in
light of the fact that individual control of litigation is unavoidably
affected by the existence of related cases."' 9 ' Though the ALI
Complex Litigation Project does not create a class action per se, it
does propose legislation that would establish a litigative unit with
interests greater than that of individual parties themselves. While
not as protected as those in class actions, a plaintiff in a
multidistrict consolidated proceeding carries less burden than that
of the single plaintiff and should therefore be subject to less protection from the due process jurisdictional analysis.
B.

Effective and Meaningful Interaction Between State Trial
Courts and the Federal Panel

At the outset of its third draft of the Complex Litigation Project, the ALI recognized that "the limitations of the present system
are so severe that, as a practical matter, they can be overcome only
by negotiations between lawyers in which a large part of the exchange is mutual forbearance from exploiting those limitations."'"
The broader purpose of Section 4.01 is to enact legislation that
would avoid this "bargaining in the shadow of no law.'"
The following Section seeks to contribute to this purpose by
articulating rules and guidelines which may be necessary for effective cooperation between the Panel and the state transferee court,
but have been unclearly drafted or overlooked by the ALI in their
description of how the Complex Litigation Panel should follow
when removing a federal case to a state trial court. Specifically,
these sections add safeguards to the provision in Section 4.01 requiring state consent to the transfer and the provision in Section
4.01 granting the Complex Litigation Panel with supervisory powers over the state court proceeding.
1. Selecting the Appropriate Judicial Authority
Section 4.01 of the Complex Litigation Project should be revised to specify that the state's highest court consent to the transfer

191. Sherman, supra note 190, at 249.
192. TENTATVE DRAFr No. 3, supra note 120, at xv.
193. Id.
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of the federal action to that state's trial courts. The current version
of section 4.01 requires that, before a federal action may be transferred to a state court for consolidation and trial, "[tjhe consent of
the appropriate judicial authority in the state in which the designated transferee court is located must be obtained."'94 Consent of the
state's appropriate judicial authority is necessary because a system
of mandatory transfer would be impractical and may threaten the
state's autonomy. Mandatory acceptance of cases from the federal
Panel would also impose an undesirable coercion of state courts,
forcing them to accept cases they may not wish to adjudicate. 95
However, the ALI did not clarify which judicial authority is
the "appropriate judicial authority" to accept the transfer. The
states' highest courts are the most appropriate source because of
their pivotal role in the state judiciary. If, for whatever reason,
consent of the state's high court is impossible or impractical, the
Panel should then seek the consent of any other legislatively or
judicially empowered, statewide judicial body, such as a state conference of judges, and, as a final alternative, the trial court to
which the action would be transferred.
The state's highest court is the most appropriate source of
authority for consent to the transfer. The other possible sources of
consent include the state trial court that would receive the action
and the state legislature or a legislatively authorized committee.
These two alternatives lack the insight into state judicial processes
that the high court would have and also may impose obstacles and
general procedural inefficiencies that the state high court would
not.

In discussing the consent provision of Section 4.01, the ALI
194. COMPLEX LmGAMION PROIFCr, supra note 1, § 4.01(a). If the Panel does not
obtain consent from the appropriate judicial authority, the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT
provides other options for the transfer. The Panel may transfer the action to another state
which it deems appropriate and which does grant consent. The Panel may alternatively
transfer the matters back to their original courts. Id. § 4.01 cmt. b. If the state to which
the Panel seeks to transfer the federal action is part of an interstate complex litigation
compact such as the one proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see UNI. TRANsFER OF LnG. AcT (1992), reprinted in COMPLEX LrnGATION PROJECr, supra note 1, at app. C, and encouraged by the COMPLEX LrTrA ON
PROJECT, see id. supra note 1, § 4.02, the Panel must seek approval of any interstate
complex litigation panel established by the compact. See id.§ 4.01 cmt. b.
195. The ALI recognized the indefiniteness of their reference to an "appropriate judicial
authority" and the difficulty in determining presently who that authority may be. COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 1, § 4.01. The COMPLEX LmGATION PROJECT, however,

falls to provide guidelines that would assist the Panel in determining where to seek consent.
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implies that the panel seek consent of the state trial judge." It
argues that requiring consent would help foster contact and develop
a close working relationship between the Panel and the state trial
judge."n The AL invokes concern for sensitivity to pending cases on the transferee court's docket as well as the propriety of
adjudicating legal issues that may or may not be central to state
law. The initial conclusion compelled by these issues is that the
trial court would be responsible for consenting to the transfer. The
conclusion is driven further by the ALI's statement that "[tihere is
also a sense that judges know best what they should or should not
adjudicate in their own courts."'93
Seeking the consent of the trial court which would receive the
action, however, overlooks the larger impact that federal-to-state
consolidation may have on the state's law and on the state
judiciary's appellate process. As the ad hoe experience of state and
federal judges has shown, intersystem cooperation risks compromising the development of state law and affecting the substantive
rights of the state parties.' For example, Judge Carl B. Rubin
recognized, during his coordination of the litigation over the
Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire," that a state judge may be concerned that the federal court would "[run] roughshod over the
whole thing. '° Finally, the Complex Litigation Project requires
that, for the purposes of maintaining efficiency and consistency,
appeal of the decision on the transferred action be made through
the state appellate process. For this reason, the power to decide
whether a state's appellate judiciary can and should handle the
federal cases should not lie with a lower state trial court but
should be given to the court of last resort.
The other alternative, placing the power to consent solely in
the hands of the state legislature, would be a needless interruption
of the state's central governmental body. At first blush, the obvious
authority to approve transfer of federal actions to state trial courts
would lie with the state legislature because it is theoretically cast
as the safeguard against federal encroachment of state powers,
196. See COMPLEX LmGASON PRoJEC, supra note 1, § 4.01.
197. See id
198. Id.
199. See William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of
Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1743 (1992).
200. See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 639 F. Supp. 915, 916 (ED. Ky. 1986).
201. Schwarzer et al., supra note 199, at 1734.
202. See ComPLEx LmGATioN PROiECr, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) & cmt. h.
203. In describing the states' governmental structure, the Constitution mandates only that
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and because the state legislatures, by explicit authority of their
state constitutions or by constitutional amendment, empower their
respective judicial systems." However, unless the state slated to
receive the federal action had a legislatively empowered committee
set aside to grant or withhold consent to the Panel's Section 4.01
transfers," the approval of the transfer by the state legislatures
would frustrate the need to transfer the action without undue delay
and would redirect the attention of the legislators to matters that
may or may not be of vital concern to them. Alternatively, requiring that each state legislature establish such a body to consider
transfer motions of the Panel would be an uncompromising encroachment on states' legislative functions.
Of the available sources of consent, the state's high court, on
the other hand, is in the best position assess the overall, statewide
benefits and burdens of receiving cases from the federal courts for
consolidation with their own state cases. Unlike the trial court that
could receive the action, the state's highest court is more capable

the states sball have republican forms of government. U.S. CONS?, art. IV, § 4. However,
James Madison argued that it is the state legislatures that are integral to an effective
federalist system. T1m FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison). See also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455-57 (1991) (concurrent federal and state government assures
increased citizen involvement in democratic process); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
271-73 (1983) (Powell, 3., dissenting) (citing examples of state legislative assertions of
individual state autonomy).
204. See, e.g., AR1Z. CONS. art. VI, § 1 (judicial power is vested in the courts as provided by law); accord ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 1; CAL. CONS?. art. VI, § 1; DEL.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6-9; N.Y. CONS?. art. VI, § 1; N.C. CONS?.
art. IV, §§ 7-10; PA. CoNsr. art. V, §§ 2(c), 3-8; RJ. CONS?. art. 10, § 1; Tax. CONS?.
art. V, §§ I, 8; VA. CONs?. art. IV, § 14; WASH. CONS?. art. IV, § 11; see also People
v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 893 (IIl. 1988) (recognizing that the legislature is "clearly
empowered to promulgate procedural rules to facilitate the exercise of judicial power");
Street v. Roberts, 529 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Ark. 1975) (Fogelman, J., dissenting) ("The
legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge the express or necessarily
implied powers, [sic] granted to this court by the constitution."). The state legislatures' authority to regulate their state courts' criminal adjudication is well recognized. See State v.
Rodriguez, 429 A.2d 919 (Conn. 1980) (legislatively imposed juror qualifications); State v.
Vasquez, 609 A.2d 29 (NJ. 1992) (mandatory sentencing guidelines).
205. The ALI's comments which discuss the indefiniteness of referring the Panel to the
"appropriate judicial authority" hold this option out as the ideal. See CompLuX LTGATION
PRoiacr,supra note 1, § 4.01 cmt. b.
206. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2428 (1992) (states that Congress may not simply "commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program" (quoting Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)); see also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982) (JIT]his
Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and
enforce laws and regulations... .2).
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of weighing the burdens on the trial court docket, the docket of the
appellate courts, and the influence that a federal presence may have
on state adjudication. Any information on the case load of the trial
court could be received by the high court from the trial judges
themselves. Because contact between the Panel and the trial judge
is important to maintaining a fruitful cooperation between the two
judicial systems,2°7 the ALI can require, or the Panel in its discretion can adopt, the practice of discussing transfer with the proposed
transferee judge prior to transfer. However, the decision of this
judge should not be relied upon to impose the kinds of burdens
that reverse removal under Section 4.01 would impose.
The procedure for obtaining consent of the state's high court
should work analogously to a federal court's certification of a
question of state law to the state's high court" The difference
being, of course, that the availability of such certification procedures are prescribed by the state legislature while Section 4.01's
consent provision would operate without interaction of the state
legislature. The states' highest court, whose daily business concerns
adjudicative matters across the state, is better equipped to respond
to the Panel's request to transfer quickly and with efficient use of
available resources. If the state legislators are fearful of having
their courts burdened by federal matters, the state could enact
appropriate legislation to allay those fears.
2. Safeguards to Ensure Meaningful Consent
Section 4.01 of the Complex Litigation Project does not pro-

vide adequate safeguards against overlooking the interests of the
litigants in the time period during which a transferee state is considering whether or not to consent to the removal of federal actions
to their trial courts. The ALI should modify the consent provision
of Section 4.01(a) to read: "The consent of the appropriate judicial
authority in the state in which the designated transferee court is
located must be obtained by the parties or by the panel with active
participation of the parties." Because the efficiency and consistency
of the state court proceedings would be adversely affected by the
retention of cases in federal court, there is a strong incentive for
the states to consent to receive the federal action from the Panel.
This incentive should not go unchecked by blackletter language

207. See Schwarzer, supra note 199, at 1733-37.
208. For a description of this process, see 17A WRIGHT Er At., supra note 25, § 4248.
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which fails to recognize litigant participation in the consent process.

As it now stands, the blackletter prescription of Section 4.01
reads: "The consent of the appropriate judicial authority in the state
in which the designated transferee court is located must be obtained." At least one commentator, however, has argued forcefully that Section 4.01 does not realistically address the consequences of state and federal court interaction on the matter of the
state's consent to receive the removed federal court action.2 ' The
argument recognizes that Section 4.01 may lead to inappropriate
bargaining between the state and federal courts because of the
federal Panel's ability to condition transfer on the acceptance of
federally recommended procedural rules and because of the strong
incentive that may compel the state court to consent in order to
have its own law applied by its own judges. This bargaining, the
argument continues, would be inconsistent with current notions of
federalism and ordinary principles of due process.21 With regard
to a different but related issue, another commentator reminded the
reporter that current procedures before the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation often allow counsel only a few minutes to
present their argumentsY2 The incentives for states to readily
consent to transfer and the small degree of participation of counsel
under the current system of multidistrict transfer, if effectuated by
the language of Section 4.01, would result in no more than the
congressional mandate of conduct resembling the ad hoe conduct
that the ALI seeks to avoid. "[The effect of [Section 4.01] is that
the location where cases are tried and even the law applied in
them is not a function of any predetermined jurisdiction or process . ... What we have here is a tremendous distortion of both

209. ComLEX LIGATION PROJEcr, supra note 1, § 4.01(a).

210. See Sessions, supra note 3, at 190 (comments of Mr. George W. Liebmann)
('The effect of [the consent provision] is that the location where cases are tried ...

is

not a function of any predetermined jurisdiction or process. It is a function of a bargaining process between the multidistrict panel and its state court counterparts.").
211. See id. The argument increases in force when one recognizes, as Mr. Liebmanr
has, that the state may feel threatened by the broad powers of the Panel under Section
5.01 to remove, on its own motion, state matters to the federal courts for consolidated
treatment with related federal matters. However, whether the powers of the Panel under
Section 5.01 am broad enough to remove large numbers of state cases for consolidation
with a relatively small number of federal cases, as would be the case should Section
4.01's consent provision be at issue, is not within the scope of this Note.
212. See Sessions, supra note 3, at 187-89 (comments of Herbert M. Watchell criticizing
the effectiveness of Section 4.01(b) factor analysis in protecting litigants' interests).
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the federal system and ordinary principles of due process
....,2,3
This distortion would "corrupt the judicial system while
relieving Congress and the state legislatures of any impetus toward
2 4
real reform of the handling of these kinds of litigation.""
Ironically, Reporter Arthur R. Miller points to the "numerous
ad hoc instances" of intersystem collaboration between federal and
state judges who have litigated large, multiforum actions as support
for his argument that the consent provision of Section 4.01 will not
be corrupted. 2 5 These ad hoc cases, Miller argues, operate in an
environment where federal and state judges exercise "reasonable
good faith."2 6 Miller is "willing to assume"" that federal judges acting under Section 4.01 will exercise the same good faith in
obtaining consent from the state court.
However, the two scenarios are not analogous. State and federal judges collaborating on an ad hoc basis have done so under
private agreements between themselves and the litigants in the case.
Both federal and state judges seek to benefit individually from
good faith participation in the coordinated proceedings. Section
4.01, however, would be a congressionally mandated procedure
under which the Panel, like the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, can, in an ideal situation, free itself completely of a
matter once it has been transferred to the state court. At worst, the
degree to which the Panel would be involved in collaboration with
the state court would be relatively small compared to those cases
to which Miller referred. 2 8 Thus, the Panel is more likely than its
ad hoc counterparts to dispose of federal matters pending before it
in a hasty manner. This encouragement risks causing a careless
search for state consent to the reverse removal.
Such carelessness on the part of the Panel could result in unnecessary and prejudicial consequences to the litigants. As the
experience of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has
shown, even judges acting in good faith can make mistakes that
result in needless expense or reduction in options to the parties to
the action. In one case, the Judicial Panel ordered the transfer of a
claim against a defendant who argued that the transferred cases

213. Id. at 190 (comments of George W. Liebmann).
214. Id.

215. Id. at 191 (comments of Arthur R. Miller).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. However, Section 4.01 does not establish definite limits on this involvement.
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involved substantially different facts 9 The result was that the
defendant's claims were remanded back to the transferor court by
the Judicial Pane!Y after eighteen months, four out-of-state trips
and over 200 lawyer-hours?' In another casep the Judicial
Panel transferred a defendant who had limited involvement with the
common issues and whose financial resources prevented it from
participating in the transfer. 3 Unable to continue in the litigation, the defendant's only option was to settle.
By incorporating a statement that requires active participation
by the parties in the consent process, Section 4.01 would be able
to guarantee that this kind of judicial economy would not compromise the litigants' valid interests in the litigation. Litigants would
not suffer from the arbitrary decisions arising out of ad hoe judicial conduct and would be ensured that judicial management of
their cases would not result without their involvement. Ultimately,
party participation in the consent process requires that the Panel's
collaboration with the state, good faith notwithstanding, does occur
without attending to the litigants' interests.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the case loads of state and federal court dockets increase,
the need for procedural rules designed to streamline the litigation
process becomes more compelling. The reverse removal device, as
formulated in the ALI's Complex Litigation Project, would contrib-

ute to the efficiency of both the state and federal judicial system

219. See In re King Resources Co. Sec. Liig., 342 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (J.P.M.L.

1972).
220. See also In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 975, 976 (J.P.M.L.

1972) (advising transferee court to remand cases involving substantially different facts).
221. See Note, supra note 15, at 1015 n.69 (citing Letter from Leigh D. Stephenson,
Esq., of Portland, Oregon, to the Harvard Law Review, Feb. 28, 1974) (recommending
that the Judicial Panel give more careful attention to the burdens of transferring litigants).

222. See In re Aviation Prods. Liab. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
223. See Note, supra note 15, at 1016 n.75 (citing Brief for Defendant Airwork Serv.

Div. of Pac. Airmotive Corp. at 2-3, In re Aviation Prods. Liab. Litig., 347 F. Supp.
1401 (J.P.M.L. 1972)). The Judicial Panel's decision did not address the defendant's individual problems.

1182

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1129

and thereby improve the effectiveness of adjudication in both fora.
By adopting the recommendations suggested above, the ALI would
be closer to providing a workable system of reverse removal that
meets the goals of efficiency and satisfies the constitutional demands of federalism and due process.
RUSSELL J. WOOD

